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FREE TRADE IN PATENTED GOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION FOR PATENTS 
Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec† 
ABSTRACT 
Modern international trade law seeks to increase global welfare by lowering barriers to 
trade and encouraging international competition. This “free trade” approach, while originally 
applied to reduce tariffs on trade, has been extended to challenge non-tariff barriers, with 
modern trade agreements targeting telecommunication regulations, industrial and product 
safety standards, and intellectual property rules. Patent law, however, remains inconsistent 
with free-trade principles by allowing patent holders to subdivide the world market along 
national borders and to forbid trade in patented goods from one nation to another. This 
Article demonstrates that the doctrines thwarting free trade in patented goods are 
protectionist remnants of long-abandoned pre-Industrial Age economic theories, and the 
modern arguments for restricting international trade in patented goods—most notably, the 
possible desirability of permitting price discrimination—provide an insufficient justification 
for restricting trade across national frontiers. The Article concludes that modern patent law 
doctrine should be modified to permit free international trade in patented goods and that, if 
price discrimination or other goals are thought desirable, better alternatives are available to 
achieve those goals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern international trade law seeks to increase global welfare by 
lowering barriers to trade and encouraging competition. Multilateral treaties 
such as the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade1 have significantly 
lowered tariffs and led to increased trade. What is more, the theories 
underlying modern trade law have been applied to non-tariff barriers to 
 
 1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
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trade,2 so that the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) includes agreements 
addressing subjects as diverse as telecommunication, industrial and product 
safety standards, and intellectual property. While the overriding purpose of 
the WTO is to encourage free trade, this principle has not been fully applied 
to patent law, placing the two fields in tension. In short, patent law grants 
rights that are fortified by national borders while trade law aims to diminish 
the relevance of borders. 
Patent law has shed many geographical distinctions from its pre-
Industrial Age roots that conflict with the formalities of free trade. These 
roots were planted in patent and trade theories that emphasized gains to the 
state, domestic industries and workers, and domestic consumers at the 
expense of other countries.3 Under a mercantilist theory of commerce, 
patents were granted based on the introduction of new goods to a country, 
without a focus on invention.4 Continued protection was based on the patent 
holder’s willingness to produce goods locally and employ apprentices to learn 
the trade.5 Patent law was not overly concerned with rewarding innovators 
for the sake of innovation, but rather with spurring domestic industry and 
supplying the domestic market with new goods. In contrast, patents are now 
available without regard to the location of invention, the nationality of the 
inventor, or the location (or fact) of production. These changes show a 
commitment to encouraging innovation for its own sake and a hands-off 
approach to effects on domestic industry and consumer welfare. The modern 
approach is consistent with modern trade theory, which eschews 
protectionism and posits net gains in worldwide welfare through decreased 
barriers to competition and trade.6 One consequence of these changes is that 
any attempt to retain some sort of protectionism through exhaustion rules 
would not just run counter to current ideas about the role of patents and 
trade, but it would be misguided; protection of U.S. patent holders is not 
protection of U.S. industry or consumers.  
Despite patent law’s incorporation of some free-trade principles, 
however, patents remain territorial rights, and in one very important respect 
patent law remains at odds with modern trade theory. Under current law, a 
U.S. patent holder may block the importation, use, or sale of patented goods 
 
 2. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS & TEXT 410–12 (4th ed. 2002). 
 3. See infra Section III.A. 
 4. See infra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 6. See generally Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of 
International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (1998) (offering an explanation of 
comparative advantage, the case for free trade, and its caveats, inter alia). 
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purchased abroad, even if purchased from a seller licensed under a foreign 
patent. In contrast, an unconditional purchase of a patented good within the 
United States exhausts the patent holder’s rights with respect to that good.7 
The doctrine of exhaustion—also called the first sale doctrine—advances 
consumer interests by limiting restraints on alienation and fosters efficient 
use of goods and competition by lowering transaction costs in resale markets 
while limiting the patent holder to a single reward for each sale. However, 
because there is no doctrine of international exhaustion for patents, there is 
no free trade in patented goods. 
This topic is particularly timely given the conflict between the Executive 
and Judicial branches on the question of international exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights. One might expect that, given the United States’ 
traditionally strong free trade stance in negotiations, the Executive branch 
would push for a rule of international exhaustion for patents. However, the 
United States Trade Representative is currently negotiating a trade 
agreement—the Trans-Pacific Partnership—requiring that member countries 
not recognize international exhaustion in intellectual property rights.8 This 
stance is not uniform throughout the branches of government. For example, 
the Supreme Court recently held in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. that the 
first sale of a book published with the copyright owner’s permission—
anywhere in the world—exhausts the owner’s rights in that book.9 Thus, 
there was no infringement of a U.S. copyright when a graduate student 
imported and sold textbooks that were lawfully purchased from a licensed 
publisher in Thailand. Given this conflict, the Court will likely face the 
question of whether an international rule of exhaustion should be applied to 
patent law as well, although it need not follow the same rule as it established 
for copyright.  
While neither trade nor patent theory supports the continuation of 
national exhaustion,10 the effects of a harmonized international exhaustion 
regime in patent law are uncertain. The standard economic argument against 
international exhaustion draws on the potential gains to patent holders and to 
consumers in low-income countries from geographic price discrimination. 
This argument describes the current rule as allowing patent holders to market 
goods worldwide, adjusting prices for countries with lower purchasing power 
 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See infra notes 175–76 and accompanying text. 
 9. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013). 
 10. In this Article, “national exhaustion” only recognizes exhaustion of the rights 
associated with patents in the country of sale. In contrast, “international exhaustion” applies 
exhaustion to relevant patents worldwide. 
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while continuing to reap rewards in high-income countries.11 An international 
exhaustion regime, according to this view, will push patent holders either to 
restrict sales to high-income markets or to offer goods at a globally uniform 
price, to the detriment of consumers in low-income countries.12 However, 
geographical price discrimination is but one of many options for identifying 
and marketing to populations with differing abilities to pay; many goods, 
regardless of patent protection, are available in different versions at different 
prices worldwide. Geographic price discrimination is desirable to firms 
because of its effectiveness at preventing arbitrage and because enforcement 
costs are shared by states through customs enforcement. It may not be the 
most desirable form of price discrimination for consumers, however, because 
it is imprecise in identifying differing demand curves. This is particularly true 
for countries with large or growing income disparities.13 A shift to 
international exhaustion would likely result in changes in how firms market 
goods, but would not necessarily entail the wholesale welfare losses that the 
standard argument suggests, because that argument compares geographic 
price discrimination with no price discrimination at all.  
The global welfare effects of an international exhaustion rule are more 
complex for the drug industry, given the heavy involvement of other 
regulatory regimes and a number of patent law measures that currently serve 
to remove the industry from typical market forces. In particular, geographical 
price discrimination may be more desirable in the drug industry because 
current price differentials reflect regulatory choices rather than demand 
differences, other forms of price discrimination may not be ethical, and 
access concerns tend to be more pressing in that industry.14 While these 
concerns are valid, they are better met through regulatory regimes that 
already control market access in the industry or through trade mechanisms, 
rather than through maintenance of a patent law rule that no longer makes 
sense for other industries.  
We can also expect that in industries amenable to it, a rule of 
international exhaustion would lead to new forms of restrictive licensing 
replacing outright sales. Software is particularly susceptible to restrictive 
licensing because of the technological possibilities of restricting the ability to 
resell or reuse it. Increased restrictive licensing may shift the exhaustion rule 
from an absolute bar on downstream constraints to a default rule that can be 
licensed around and is one method to retain price discrimination that need 
 
 11. See infra notes 217–20 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 217–20 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 222–23 and accompanying text. 
 14. See discussion infra Section V.E. 
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not be geographic in nature. However, there is nothing inherently 
“international” about this problem, although its importance may increase 
under an international exhaustion regime. Addressing the desired bounds and 
strength of such licenses is beyond the scope of this Article, besides noting 
that adoption of international exhaustion would leave the area ripe for 
further inquiry. 
Adopting international exhaustion for patents would make this area of 
patent law consistent with the free-trade theory that informs the rest of 
patent law. Reducing barriers to trade in order to encourage efficient 
production and increased consumer welfare—the primary goals of 
international trade law—provides a compelling argument for an international 
exhaustion regime in patent law.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses modern theories of 
patent and trade law, and shows how the doctrine of international exhaustion 
fits into both. Part III describes mercantilist trade theory, its influence on 
patent law, and the evolution of both fields toward free trade principles. This 
Part situates national exhaustion as anomalous in modern patent law, raising 
the question of whether there are reasons to maintain the current rule of 
national exhaustion. Part IV explains the doctrinal development of patent 
exhaustion in the United States—both the domestic embrace of exhaustion 
as a means to limit transaction costs in downstream markets and the courts’ 
rejection of international exhaustion, despite the applicability of the values 
embodied in domestic exhaustion doctrine. Part V looks at potential 
methods of implementing an international exhaustion regime and responds 
to criticisms such a change faces. In particular, this Part responds to some 
economic critiques of international exhaustion, addresses potential strategic 
reactions to such a rule, and develops a potential carve-out for 
pharmaceutical products. Part VI concludes. 
II. PATENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
CONFLICTS AND CONFLUENCES 
Patent law is territorial and protects markets, whereas trade theory has 
been on a relentless march to bring down barriers to cross-border trade and 
foster competition in manufacturing. Thus, at first glance it appears that their 
treatment of the question of international exhaustion for patents would also 
be directly opposed. However, a closer look reveals that patent law has been 
moving away from protection of national markets and that trade law may 
sometimes deviate from pure free trade principles in its approach to 
intellectual property matters. 
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A. PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVE 
Patents and copyrights are exclusive rights granted to authors and 
inventors in order to encourage progress in science and the useful arts.15 The 
regimes are governed by separate statutes and common law. Nevertheless, 
the constitutional underpinnings and much of the governing theories are the 
same. Through a time-limited right to exclude others from exploitation of 
their works, authors and inventors are encouraged to create, invent, and 
disseminate the fruits of their labor to the benefit of society at large. 
Excluding competition gives a patent holder the opportunity to sell goods at 
a premium price, the size of which will depend on demand for the invention 
and the availability of noninfringing substitutes.16 Patents are “widely 
considered essential . . . to provide appropriate incentives for innovation.”17 
They encourage investment in innovation by allowing inventors to reap a 
higher reward for their inventions during the patent term.18 
Patents are granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
for inventions that are new, useful, and nonobvious.19 For the duration of the 
patent term,20 its holder may bring suit against infringers seeking damages 
and injunctive relief.21 Unauthorized use, manufacture, sale, or importation of 
a patented invention constitutes infringement that can be challenged in 
federal district courts, resulting in damages and/or a permanent injunction.22 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 1997 (2007) (discussing the relevance of noninfringing substitute goods to 
reasonable royalty rates); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent 
Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 13–14 (2001) (noting the effect noninfringing 
substitutes should have on damages calculations before discussing the difficulty of assessing 
substitutability). 
 17. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 922; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex 
Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 130 (2004). 
 18. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system 
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public 
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly 
for a limited period of time.”). 
 19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012) (detailing subject matter, novelty, and nonobviousness 
requirements). In addition, patents require disclosure of the invention sufficient to allow 
others to reproduce it upon expiration of the right. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 20. Currently, the patent term lasts twenty years from the date of application. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a)(2) (2012). 
 21. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84 (2012) (allowing courts to “grant injunctions in accordance 
with the principles of equity” and compensatory and punitive damages). 
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (Infringement occurs when someone “without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or 
imports into the United States any patented invention” during the patent term). The statute 
 
 324 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:317  
In addition, a patent holder can seek to exclude infringing imports from the 
domestic market by bringing suit at the International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”) and proving importation of articles that infringe U.S. patents.23 A 
U.S. patent cannot be used to stop infringing conduct abroad; the patent laws 
do not apply extraterritorially.24 This is one reason the Patent Act designates 
importation of infringing goods as an act of infringement as well.25 
The patent grant results in the social benefits associated with spurring 
innovation that would not have occurred—or would have occurred later—
but for the incentive26 as well as allowing others to benefit from—and build 
upon—the information contained in the disclosure.27 There are also social 
costs, such as diminished access to the invention during the patent term for 
would-be users and downstream innovators engaged in incremental 
innovation. The diminished access is a result of the higher prices a patent 
holder can command during the patent term. The utilitarian analysis of the 
 
was amended in 1994 to include importation as a means of infringement. See Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, sec. 533, § 271, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4988–90 (1994).  
 23. Complaints may be initiated at the ITC alleging sale for importation or U.S. sales 
following importation of patented products or products that are produced through a 
patented process. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012). The provision also outlaws importation 
of copyrighted materials. Id. Subsequent provisions outlaw importation of articles that 
violate U.S. trademarks or registered semiconductor chip masks, § 1337(a)(1)(C)–(D), and, 
pursuant to a 1999 amendment, articles protected by design patents, § 1337(a)(1)(E). 
 24. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, 
the globalization and fragmentation of manufacturing supply chains has resulted in a 
changing definition of what constitutes extraterritorial application of patent laws and an 
expanded understanding of what constitutes infringing activity subject to U.S. patent law. 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility after Transocean, 61 EMORY L. J. 1087 
(2012) (discussing expanded extraterritoriality); Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in 
U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119 (2008) (suggesting that decisions involving 
extraterritorial application of U.S. patent protection should look to foreign patent law); see 
also Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 
F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that an offer to sell that was made abroad, but 
contemplated a sale “within the U.S., for delivery and use within the U.S. constitutes an offer 
to sell within the U.S. under § 271(a)”); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 418 F.3d 
1282, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming a finding of infringement of patented system 
despite location of Relay in Canada but rejecting infringement of method claims where the 
Relay step was performed in Canada).  
 25. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Even without the importation provision, any of the other 
prohibited actions (such as use or sale) of imported, infringing goods would have been 
actionable. Designation of importation and offers to sell as infringing activity was a result of 
the TRIPS Agreement. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for 
Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 722 (2004). 
 26. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 
YALE L.J. 1590 (2011). 
 27. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009); see also Sean B. 
Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010). 
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costs and benefits of a patent system is the dominant one among patent law 
scholars,28 attractive because it suggests that there is an ideal balance of 
interests and that—where that balance is not promoted—the law can be 
tailored to do so.29 These tailoring measures are usually adaptations of the 
limits that already exist in patent law. Thus, from the basic structure and 
trade-off of patent law, scholars, courts, and the government have studied, 
proposed, and engaged in tailoring measures to address specific instances in 
which the law has led to holdup or other problematic outcomes that fail to 
meet the theoretical ideal balance of interests.30 
One limitation on patent holders’ exclusive rights is the doctrine of 
exhaustion, which frees from infringement downstream sales and uses of 
inventions initially sold with the particular patent holder’s authorization.31 As 
a result, the patent holder need not “authorize” each and every sale for 
subsequent sales and uses to be non-infringing, and would-be purchasers 
need not research and understand myriad restrictions attached to all the 
goods they purchase.32 The exhaustion doctrine thus reduces transaction 
costs of disposing of purchased goods while vindicating ideas of consumer 
rights in the goods they own. It also limits a patent holder’s control over 
sales and uses that may compete with her own sales, thereby fostering 
competition in resale markets. Another explanation for exhaustion puts it in 
 
 28. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2–3 (2011). 
 29. Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Evaluating Flexibility in International Patent Law, 65 
HASTINGS L. J. 153, 160 (2013). 
 30. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1362 (2009); Anna B. Laakmann, An 
Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43 (2012) 
(suggesting patentable subject matter doctrine as a potential policy lever for calibrating 
patent scope); Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 207 (2011) (suggesting two new patent forms that would mitigate the social costs of 
traditional patents and increase access by subsequent inventors); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, 
Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 733, 742–48 (2012) (suggesting that 
courts analyze the public interest in encouraging innovation and promoting access in 
determining the appropriateness of a permanent injunction when a patent holder lacks 
market share). 
 31. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 533 U.S. 617, 625 (2008); see also 
Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 483, 484 (2010) (“The right of a purchaser to control the downstream sale and use 
of patented goods without obtaining consent from the patent owner conflicts with the right 
of a patent owner to exclude others from practicing his invention when selling or using 
those goods.”); infra Part III. 
 32. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 914 (2008) 
(discussing information-processing obstacles and costs associated with servitudes on chattel). 
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terms of what the inventor deserves—namely, a single reward for each 
product she sells—and no more.33 Exhaustion has developed as a common 
law doctrine in the United States,34 and is consistent with property law’s 
aversion to restrictive servitudes35 and restraints on alienation,36 in addition to 
economic ideas about reducing transaction costs.37 Typically called simply 
“exhaustion,” the doctrine has generally been applied only to goods that have 
been sold within the United States,38 and this Article refers to it as “national 
exhaustion” to distinguish it from international exhaustion. 
International patent exhaustion would extend the current rule to patented 
goods first sold abroad, so that the first unconditional, authorized sale 
anywhere in the world would exhaust a patent holder’s rights in the U.S. 
patent.39 Currently, foreign sales do not exhaust domestic patent rights and 
unauthorized importation constitutes infringement. This position appears 
consistent with a traditional understanding of the scope of rights associated 
with a patent. Each nation’s patent law has historically provided nothing 
more or less than territorial exclusion rights, whereas a rule of international 
 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. See infra Part IV. A similar doctrine is that of “implied license,” according to which 
the sale of a good comes with an implied license to use, repair, and sell it according to the 
common and reasonable expectations of the buyer. Although the system in the United States 
adheres more closely to the exhaustion formulation, the language of applied license is still 
used to draw the lines between “making” a new patented product and “using” a previously 
purchased product. See, e.g., Bowman v. Monsanto, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). Exhaustion for 
copyright also developed as a common law doctrine, but was later codified. See discussion 
infra Section V.A. 
 35. See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 381, 430–34 (2005) (discussing exhaustion cases and questioning the 
theoretical basis for limiting servitudes by recasting use restrictions as a type of product 
design). 
 36. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale 
Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 493 (2011) (noting that national 
exhaustion reflects “the common law’s strong policy against restraints on alienation . . . .”); 
see also infra Part IV (discussing the doctrinal development of national exhaustion). 
 37. See Van Houweling, supra note 32, at 915. 
 38. See infra Part IV. 
 39. International exhaustion would not apply to goods made without authorization—
for such goods importation constitutes infringement regardless. Nor would it affect the 
treatment of goods that a U.S. patent holder has authorized someone to import—this 
already renders the importation (and subsequent sales and use) non-infringing. Rather, an 
international exhaustion regime would mean that an authorized sale abroad exhausts 
domestic patent rights so that importation does not constitute infringement, even if the 
authorization was limited to sales in a particular foreign market—it is subsequent uses and 
sales that would not be subject to claims of infringement. 
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exhaustion frustrates territorial exercise of those rights.40 A strictly national 
rule of exhaustion allows a patent holder to control the first sale of patented 
goods in the domestic market without competition from unauthorized 
imports, thus securing the market and allowing her to reap whatever reward 
the market will bear. In contrast, international exhaustion permits those who 
have bought patented goods abroad to use and sell them domestically 
without authorization from the patent holder, diminishing the patent holder’s 
control of the domestic market. Just as a rule of exhaustion limits rewards to 
an inventor, so would a move from a rule of national exhaustion to one of 
international exhaustion. 
However, the factors motivating a national exhaustion rule can also apply 
to goods purchased abroad. The nature of manufacturing, sales, and personal 
life are ever more globalized, making the information and transaction cost 
arguments from national exhaustion applicable to international transactions 
as well.41 Margreth Barrett espouses the single reward argument in the 
international context and suggests that inventors can choose whether to place 
their goods into the stream of commerce abroad, but once they do, the 
opportunity for further reward should be extinguished.42 And arguments 
about the proper scope of exhaustion and in what circumstances it can be 
contracted around also translate to the international setting.43 Thus, although 
at first glance patent laws are territorial and would appear not to support a 
rule of international exhaustion, the theories that support it in a domestic 
 
 40. See ADELMAN ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN PATENT LAW 3 (2011) (“[T]here is no 
such thing as a ‘global patent.’ ”). 
 41. See infra Part IV (discussing the territorial limitations—within the United States—at 
issue in early exhaustion cases). 
 42. Margreth Barrett, The United States’ Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel Imports of Patented 
Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911, 965 (2000) (“The key is that the patentee chose to make the 
initial sale. If a sale is not sufficiently beneficial, or undercuts his financial position in other 
sales, the patentee may refrain from making it.”). Barrett’s article is from 2000, when the 
U.S. position on international doctrine was somewhat less clear. She argued that the United 
States had a modified international exhaustion regime on the basis of doctrinal development 
to that point. See id. 
 43. There is nothing specific to domestic transactions that changes the relevance of 
arguments that, on the one hand, allowing for contractual circumvention of exhaustion when 
there is notice will result in more efficient transactions, or, on the other hand, the associated 
information and transaction costs attached to goods circulated in high volume are so high 
that consumers are not able to meaningfully distinguish them, and will therefore accept 
restrictions they are unaware of and that are ultimately inefficient. Compare Vincent 
Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s It Good For?, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1087 (2011) 
(arguing that exhaustion ought to be a default rule that can be contracted around), with Van 
Houweling, supra note 32, at 914–15 (discussing the notice and information costs associated 
with allowing servitudes to run with chattel). 
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setting apply equally internationally, and a historical understanding of patent 
law does little to justify the distinction.44 
B. TRADE LAW PERSPECTIVE 
Patent law interests only partially explain the arguments in favor of 
exhaustion. The choice between a national and international exhaustion 
regime sits squarely at the intersection of patent and trade law and theory. 
And from a distance, the patent law and trade law views on international 
exhaustion appear to be in conflict.45 However, there are trade arguments on 
both sides of the issue as well. In the context of international trade law, 
national exhaustion may be considered a barrier to efficient trade on the one 
hand, or a means of price discrimination that accords greater access to 
countries with lower incomes, on the other. 
Modern international trade law seeks to increase global welfare by 
lowering barriers to trade and encouraging competition. Increased trade leads 
countries to specialize in industries in which they have a comparative 
advantage over others.46 This specialization, in turn, leads to scaling of 
industries, which achieves further efficiencies.47 Comparative advantage may 
arise from differences in the abundance of factors of production, such as 
labor (skilled or unskilled), arable land, or even innovation—either in general 
 
 44. See infra Part III. Just as there is nothing specific to patent law that requires only 
national exhaustion, in the copyright context, the Court in Kirtsaeng explained that, although 
publishers might like to charge different prices in different markets, they could “find no 
basic principle of copyright law that suggests that publishers are especially entitled to such 
rights.” Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1370 (2013). 
 45. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Andrés Moncayo von Hase, Intellectual Property Protection and 
International Trade: Exhaustion of Rights Revisited, 16 WORLD COMPETITION 115, 116 (1992) 
(noting “the tension between free trade, which is a basic objective of the international 
trading system, and the exercise by private entities of the exclusive rights conferred under 
intellectual property legislation,” and its manifestation in the application of exhaustion, in 
particular). 
 46. KRUGMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY & POLICY 24 (2012). 
The book gives an example in which the United States produces 10 million roses for 
Valentine’s Day but, with the same resources, could have produced 100,000 computers 
instead. In contrast, sunny Columbia can produce 10 million roses easily, and devoting those 
resources to making computers would only yield 30,000 computers. The difference in price 
ratios means that roses are relatively more expensive to produce in the United States in 
winter than in Columbia, and vice versa with respect to computers. Trade allows the United 
States to stop growing winter roses and Columbia to shift its resources out of computer 
manufacturing. Both countries are better off than before. This is the (very) basic explanation 
of the gains from trade based on comparative advantage, generally attributed to the 
economist David Ricardo. See Sykes, supra note 6, at 55. 
 47. KRUGMAN, supra note 46, at 24. 
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or for specific industries.48 Of course, if transportation costs are high or 
countries impose large tariffs on imports, it is harder for foreign goods to 
compete, even if they are made more efficiently than domestic goods. If the 
costs associated with trade are low, however, we can expect greater efficiency 
in manufacturing, leading to higher social welfare.49 Tariffs are barriers to 
efficient trade because they artificially inflate the prices of goods from abroad 
and result in suboptimal levels of specialization. 
The traditional explanation for the benefits from international trade and 
the barriers presented by tariffs underlies the Generalized Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), a multilateral agreement signed in 1947, the 
purpose of which was the “substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade 
barriers and. . . the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous basis.”50 The agreement and subsequent rounds of negotiation 
resulted in thousands of tariff reductions affecting tens of billions of dollars 
of trade.51 Further efforts led to establishment of the World Trade 
 
 48. Sykes, supra note 6, at 55–56 (noting that “nations with lots of innovators and 
skilled workers may tend to have comparative advantage in producing relatively new 
products, but over time comparative advantage may shift toward ‘imitator’ nations with less-
skilled but cheaper work forces”); see also Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 
EMORY L.J. 639 (2014) (describing how local laws have given rise to the United States’ 
comparative advantage in internet innovation). 
 49. Lowering tariffs is Kaldor–Hicks efficient—that is, it is a move that does not make 
everyone universally better off, but provides a net gain to the world when taking into 
account the losses. For example, workers in an industry that does not have a competitive 
advantage will be worse off if their plants close due to competition from imports. One 
solution to this is to pay the “losers” from trade out of the surplus. Trade Adjustment 
Assistance in the United States is such a scheme, providing some form of financial and 
educational benefits to workers in industries affected by trade. See Sykes, supra note 6, at 61 
(“the removal of impediments to trade is likely to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, but not in 
general Pareto efficient”); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 669–71 (describing Trade 
Adjustment Assistance). 
 50. GATT, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 51. See Douglas A. Irwin, International Trade Agreements, in THE CONCISE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 298 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008), available at http:// 
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/InternationalTradeAgreements.html (explaining that the 
“annual gain from removal of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade as a result of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement . . . has been put at about $96 billion, or 0.4 percent of world GDP”). 
The negotiations that led to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) that subsumed and 
expanded on GATT recognized that as tariffs were reduced, other non-tariff barriers to 
trade would become more relevant obstructions to trade. One such potential barrier was 
intellectual property. The TRIPS Agreement addresses the barrier of different levels of IP 
protection and requires all member countries to implement a baseline level of intellectual 
property rights, but leaves it to members to determine the appropriate stance on exhaustion. 
Frederick M. Abbott, Second Report (Final) to the Committee on International Trade Law 
of the International Law Association on the Subject of the Exhaustion of Intellectual 
Property Rights and Parallel Importation (Sept. 6, 2000), in 69TH CONFERENCE OF THE 
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Organization and associated agreements to reduce tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade as a means of enhancing welfare worldwide.52 The TRIPS 
Agreement that forms part of the WTO, for example, characterizes variations 
in the protection of intellectual property rights as a non-tariff barrier to trade, 
and seeks to minimize such variations through minimum requirements for 
protection of intellectual property rights.53 The removal of these various 
trading restrictions has fostered the growth of multinational companies and 
transnational supply chains.54 
From a trade viewpoint, a national exhaustion rule may be characterized 
as a trading cost that hinders efficient downstream sales and uses of products 
because of the requirement to seek authorization for each contemplated 
resale market. This viewpoint appears to pit patent law against trade. For 
example, Frederick Abbott describes the national exhaustion regime as a 
claim that “the value of protecting intellectual property at the national and 
regional level exceeds the value to the world economic system of open trade 
among nations and regions.”55 A rule of international exhaustion, then, 
would limit the patent right after the patent holder authorizes sale in one 
country, paving the way for subsequent importation to—and resale in—all 
WTO member countries. This would result in more efficient manufacture 
and distribution through increased competition.56 However, because even 
international exhaustion allows monopoly control over initial market 
placement, the trade literature demonstrates concern over a possible loss in 
global welfare if international exhaustion leads lower-income markets to be 
unserved or underserved.57 In other words, unlike the typical comparative 
advantage story, patent holders can choose not to compete with imports by 
 
INT’L LAW ASSOC., July 2000, at 13 (explaining that “[t]he TRIPS Agreement was designed 
to assure an adequate level of legal protection for the technology and expression 
components of goods and services in world trade.”). 
 52. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] (stating desire of members 
to substantially reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade in order to raise standards of living 
and employment levels, expand the production of and trade in goods and services, and allow 
for optimal use of world resources). 
 53. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 54. See Irwin, supra note 51. 
 55. Abbott, supra note 51, at 13. 
 56. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Parallel Importation: Economic and Social Welfare 
Dimensions, INT’L INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2007), http://www. 
iisd.org/pdf/2007/parallel_importation.pdf. 
 57. See discussion infra Section V.B. 
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choosing not to sell abroad, thus undermining, rather than enhancing, the 
benefits of trade.58  
III. RECONCILING PATENT AND TRADE THEORY: 
EVOLUTION IN TANDEM 
Although at first glance patent law supports rights that are confined to 
national borders, and trade law aims to diminish the relevance of borders, the 
full story is more complicated. Each discipline offers counterarguments to its 
respective “first glance” position. However, an understanding of seventeenth 
century patent and trade law gives context to the emphasis patent law has 
placed on domestic enforcement of rights. This understanding shows how 
national exhaustion is built on protectionist ideas that have consistently been 
excised from patent law and leads us to question whether it is still justified. 
The roots of patent law are entwined with those of international trade, 
and though their guiding theories have evolved, it has been an evolution in 
tandem. From mercantilist mechanisms of domestic market and industry 
control to free market mores that do not discriminate based on the origin of 
goods and encourage a global marketplace, the natures of patent laws and 
trade regulation have changed to fit evolving ends. And like patent law, trade 
law represents a balancing of interests.59 The content of those interests and 
the level and type of regulation used to promote them are radically different 
now than during the seventeenth century. In trade, strong government 
involvement and restrictive border measures have given way to free markets, 
nearly nonexistent tariffs, and even reductions in non-tariff barriers to trade. 
In patent law, invention has become an essential requirement where before a 
willingness to introduce a new product was more important.60 The origin of 
an inventor and the place of invention are no longer relevant to patentability 
 
 58. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. The economic arguments for and against 
international exhaustion will be discussed in Part V; here, it suffices to note that there is a 
counterargument to the unequivocal lowering of barriers to trade that has characterized 
much of modern trade law and theory. 
 59. “Since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers,” writes Douglas Irwin, “there 
has been a dual view of trade: a recognition of the benefits of international exchange 
combined with a concern that certain domestic industries (or laborers, or culture) would be 
harmed by foreign competition.” Douglas A. Irwin, A Brief History of International Trade Policy, 
LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY (Nov. 26, 2001), http://www.econlib.org/library/ 
Columns/Irwintrade.html. 
 60. The Case of Monopolies, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.); 11 Co. Rep. 84 b. The 
Statute of Monopolies limited the ability of the sovereign to grant monopolies but included 
an exception for invention patents, thus carving out inventions as deserving of privileges that 
were otherwise becoming frowned upon. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3 (Eng.). 
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standards.61 And provisions meant to ensure local manufacture and domestic 
availability of goods have given way to laws that allow patent holders to 
enforce patents they do not practice.62 These shifts away from protectionist 
methods of controlling markets are evident in modern trade and patent law. 
From this viewpoint, a rule of limited, national exhaustion appears as one 
more vestige of a national policy that regulated the market in order to entice 
the production and sale of innovative products in the patent-granting 
country. The elimination of such measures from trade law suggests their 
elimination from patent law as well. In addition, other changes in patent law 
consistent with free trade ideas have rendered a national exhaustion rule 
ineffective at achieving protectionist purposes. Situating the protection of 
national markets for sales in patented goods in its historical context makes a 
strong theoretical case for an international exhaustion rule.  
 
 61. William Hubbard explains: 
[U]nder the Patent Act of 1793, U.S. patents could only issue to “a citizen 
or citizens of the United States.” In 1800, Congress amended the Patent 
Act to extend patent eligibility to foreign inventors, but only if those 
inventors resided in America for two years and took an oath of their 
intention to become United States citizens. For more than forty years, the 
United States offered no patent protection to the discoveries of 
nonresident foreign inventors, so that “foreign inventions could be 
introduced to America without the additional cost of the inventor’s 
monopoly rights.” In 1836, Congress amended the Patent Act to allow 
nonresident foreign inventors to obtain U.S. patents, but simultaneously 
introduced a protectionist scheme of patent application fees. The fee 
schedule required that a U.S. citizen pay $30 to file a patent application, a 
“subject of the King of Great Britain” pay $500, and any other 
nonresident noncitizen pay $300 to file an application for a U.S. patent. 
Protectionist application fees remained in place until 1870, when 
Congress established uniform fees for all patent applicants regardless of 
nationality or residency. 
William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 356–57 (2013) (citations and 
quotations omitted). In addition, until 1994, U.S. inventors had advantages over foreign 
patent applicants in establishing relevant invention dates. Id. at 357. However, the TRIPS 
Agreement requires that patents be available “without discrimination as to the place of 
invention . . . .” TRIPS, supra note 53, art. 27. As a result of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
United States changed its law to allow use of foreign activity to prove invention dates. More 
recently, the United States has eliminated requirements of proving dates of invention in 
passing the America Invents Act, which requires that a patent issue to the first inventor to 
file as opposed to the first to invent. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 62. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) was enacted in 1988 allowing recovery for 
infringement even when the patent holder did not practice the patent and refused to license 
it. Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674. 
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A. MERCANTILIST TRADE AND PATENT LAWS 
The availability of goods from other lands has been recognized as 
desirable for thousands of years.63 Patent law, too, has a long history; its 
origins have been traced to fifteenth century Venice.64 This Section focuses 
on theories that emerged as dominant in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and which coincide with the rise of the industrial era.65 During this 
time, the scale of trade and technological innovation grew dramatically, 
concurrent with “the rise of nation-states as political entities.”66 Although 
there were parallel themes in other countries, this Section focuses on 
England, both because it is representative and because English patent law 
provided the model for United States law. 
The trade literature in England before and during the Industrial 
Revolution included varied ideas on the benefits of trade, but certain 
interconnected themes run through it. These pro-trade and pro-regulation 
views are broadly referred to as mercantilism. Mercantilist literature placed 
 
 63. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE 11 (1996) (quoting 12 PLUTARCH, On 
Whether Water or Fire is More Useful, in PLUTARCH’S MORALIA 299 (Loeb Classical Library 
1927) (“the sea brought the Greeks the vine from India, from Greece transmitted the use of 
grain across the sea, from Phoenicia imported letters as a memorial against forgetfulness, 
thus preventing the greater part of mankind from being wineless, grainless, and unlettered”)). 
And for just as long, it has been recognized that limits on that trade might be desirable as 
well. Id. at 14–15 (discussing Aristotle’s suggestion that “import trade should stop at the 
provision of certain essential items, such as food for consumption and timber for 
shipbuilding”). 
 64. CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, THE ENGLISH 
PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1880, at 10 (1988). Earlier exclusive grants for creative behavior have 
also been chronicled. See, e.g., Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 
41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 615, 617 (1959) (describing a decree by Roman Emperor Constantine 
in A.D. 337 exempting “artisans of certain trades” from all civil duties for working on their 
craft “and instructing their sons” in it). Klitzke also cites an account of an exclusive right to 
produce for inventors from 500 B.C.: “in Sybaris, a Greek colony famous for luxurious 
living and self-indulgence, if any confectioner or cook invented a peculiar and exclusive dish, 
no one else was allowed to make it for a year.” Id. at 617 (citing Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, 
in 3 BOHN’S CLASSICAL LIBRARY 835 (1854)). 
 65. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 20–23 (2007) (describing fourteenth and fifteenth century grants of exclusivity as “proto-
patents” and “quasi-patents,” before suggesting that mid-fifteenth century Venetian law 
provided the model for other European countries to institute invention-based patent grants 
(quoting Hansjoerg Pohlmann, The Inventor’s Right in Early German Law: Materials of the Time 
from 1531 to 1700, 43 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 121, 122 (1961); F.D. Prager, The Early Growth and 
Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y, 106, 123 (1952))). 
 66. IRWIN, supra note 63, at 28 (generally providing excellent incarnations of theories 
that gained momentum and began to have worldwide impact when the industrial revolution 
led to a remarkable expansion in both trade and material amenable to patenting); MACLEOD, 
supra note 64 (same); Klitzke, supra note 64 (same). 
 334 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:317  
particular value on regulating trade in order (1) to reach a favorable balance 
of trade—promoting national wealth and economic growth through the 
accumulation of gold and silver, (2) to increase employment, and (3) to 
protect and foster domestic industry.67 Although mercantilism emphasized 
the potential benefits of trade to domestic interests, government regulation 
was considered important to counter situations where “merchants might 
pursue profitable commercial activities that could prove detrimental to the 
nation as a whole.”68 At the same time, mercantilist thought was by no means 
entirely based on consumer interests. The result, explains Thomas Nachbar, 
was that “not only profit but also free competition was discouraged, for 
while competition might maximize supply, it would result in prices too low 
for craftsmen to live on.”69 According to the mercantilists, national 
governments could provide incentives that would shape the actions of 
traders to enrich the nation as a whole by encouraging exports while 
discouraging over-consumption of luxury imports.70 This in turn would 
maintain a favorable balance of trade. It also encouraged a composition of 
trade that would promote economic development and employment in 
manufacturing.71 
The value of a favorable balance of trade was that a net exporting 
country became richer relative to other countries because of its increase in 
gold and silver stores.72 The pursuit of a favorable balance of trade 
demonstrates how mercantilists were focused on the benefits of trade to a 
particular nation and the protection of national interests.73 In this sense, 
mercantilists saw international trade as a zero-sum game. Regulation of the 
composition of traded goods was one of the means mercantilists suggested 
for controlling the balance of trade. For example, importing raw goods that 
were relatively cheap, promoting domestic manufacturing, and exporting the 
resulting goods would increase England’s store of wealth. Regulation of the 
composition of trade served other purposes as well, promoting employment 
and the advance of domestic industry. The prevailing view was that the 
export of raw materials that would be used by manufacturers abroad was not 
 
 67. IRWIN, supra note 63, at 26 (quoting A. W. COATS, Mercantilism: Economic Ideas, 
History, Policy, in ON THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 40, 46 (1992)). 
 68. Id. at 31–32. 
 69. Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 1313, 1318–19 (2005). 
 70. IRWIN, supra note 63, at 32–33. 
 71. Id. at 33–34 (discussing low or zero-interest government loans to merchants who 
were engaged in export). 
 72. Id. at 34–35. 
 73. Id. 
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in the national interest, whereas exporting manufactured goods was a 
benefit.74 As Irwin explains, mercantilists thought that “[b]ecause processing 
activities generated more value and employment than other sectors, the 
economy should be oriented toward importing raw materials and exporting 
finished goods.”75  
It is also interesting to note the secondary role played by the interests of 
consumers. While international trade certainly made a greater variety of 
goods available to a greater swath of society, this was not seen as a driving 
interest for trade law. Trade regulation was effected through the grants of 
“exclusive trade privileges” of different sorts, including grants that resemble 
modern patent grants to inventors or grants for inventions and industries 
that the recipient had introduced to England, regardless of inventorship.76 All 
of these exclusive grants were termed “letters patent,” although this 
association was not necessarily beneficial—exclusive grants came under 
heavy criticism as they were frequently bestowed by the Crown upon favorite 
merchants.77 The passage of the Statute of Monopolies in 1623 aimed to curb 
abusive grants of letters patent by the Monarchy, but did not necessarily end 
the use of monopoly grants for trade regulation by the state.78 
Because there was no formal distinction between patents for invention 
and these other grants, it is no stretch to say that our patent system has its 
roots in trade law. Mercantilist values informed the development of the 
patent system and are evident in many of its early characteristics. Holger 
 
 74. Id. at 38 (suggesting that this is a proposition with which “[v]irtually all mercantilists 
would agree”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Nachbar, supra note 69, at 1323–25 (describing four categories of such privileges, all 
of which were called “letters patent”: (1) patent-type privileges, (2) the exemption from 
other regulations, such as requirements to use English shipping or export prohibitions, (3) 
rights to supervise a particular trade, and (4) common trade monopolies unrelated to 
inventions). 
 77. See Duffy, supra note 65, at 25 (detailing how monopolies were granted for 
commonly available commodities such as “vinegar, salt, horns, iron, bags, [and] bottles 
. . . .”); Klitzke, supra note 64, at 632–33. 
 78. Scholars also point to the earlier Case of Monopolies, invalidating a monopoly on the 
manufacture and import of playing cards for its role in curbing abusive monopoly grants. See, 
e.g., Duffy, supra note 65, at 26; see also Nachbar, supra note 69, at 1327–34 (providing a 
detailed recounting of the case and pointing to routine grants of exclusive trade privileges 
that occurred for years following the Case of Monopolies to argue that the case was “an assault 
on the monarchy, not on exclusive trade privileges”). For a discussion of one later, state-
granted monopoly, see William A. Pettigrew, Free to Enslave: Politics and the Escalation of 
Britain’s Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1688–1714, 64 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (2007) (discussing the 
Royal African Company’s monopoly on slave trade, the political fight to end it, and the 
resulting expansion of slave trade). 
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Hestermeyer suggests that patent law developed primarily as “a means to 
promote the industrial advancement of the nation.”79 Similarly, Stephen Van 
Dulken writes that “[t]he patent system in England gradually evolved out of 
the royal prerogative used to encourage new trades, especially from 
abroad.”80 The English progenitors of patents, “letters of protection,” were 
meant to encourage the development of new crafts and industry in the 
country. Letters of protection were granted “by the English crown to named 
foreign craftsmen, mainly weavers, saltmakers and glassmakers, with the 
intention of encouraging them to settle in England and transmit their skills to 
native apprentices.”81 The characteristics of these grants of privilege, and 
later monopolies, to those who brought industrial know-how to England 
reveal them as encouraging employment for citizens, self-sufficiency through 
technology transfer, and curbing the flow of money out of England.82  
Local manufacture and the promise to take apprentices were seen as the 
important gains from patent grants.83 The requirement that a patent be 
worked locally is consistent with mercantilist ideas about the balance of trade 
by ensuring that manufacture was done in England. Local working 
encouraged the importation of raw materials and the export of worked 
materials. It also supported domestic industry. In particular, by requiring that 
patent holders take apprentices, patent grants ensured that the industry could 
continue to operate even following the expiration of the patent term.84 
 
 79. HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO, THE CASE OF PATENTS 
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 21 (2007). 
 80. STEPHEN VAN DULKEN, BRITISH PATENTS OF INVENTION 1617–1977, A GUIDE 
FOR RESEARCHERS 2 (1999). The first patent monopoly in England may have been granted 
in 1449, to John of Utynam, who returned to England from Flanders to “instruct divers 
lieges of the king in many arts never used in the realm besides glass making,” and who was 
thereby allowed the right to grant or withhold consent for others to practice such arts for 
twenty years. Klitzke, supra note 64, at 627 (quoting ARTHUR ALLAN GOMME, PATENTS OF 
INVENTION: ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IN BRITAIN 5–6 (1946)).  
 81. MACLEOD, supra note 64, at 10. MacLeod explains how the fifteenth-century 
Venetian patent system spurred the development of other, modern patent systems: 
“Emigrant Italian craftsmen, seeking protection against local competition and guild 
restrictions as a condition of imparting their skills, disseminated knowledge of their patent 
systems around Europe.” Id. at 11. 
 82. Klitzke, supra note 64, at 628 (citing 1 WALKER ON PATENTS 3 (Anthony William 
Deller ed., 1937) (citing a letter from Chancellor Moreton to Parliament during the reign of 
Henry VII)). 
 83. Klitzke, supra note 64, at 624 (explaining how patent grants were conditioned on 
taking apprentices). 
 84. A number of scholars have suggested that the purpose of the fourteen-year patent 
term was to allow for teaching two generations of apprentices. See, e.g., MACLEOD, supra note 
64, at 18; P.J. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y, 292, 304 
(1929) (“The term of apprenticeship was seven years. Fourteen years may have been chosen 
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The characteristics of early invention patents align with mercantilist trade 
purposes rather than focusing solely on encouraging innovation.85 For 
example, invention was not the sine qua non of the patent that it is today. As 
Christine MacLeod explains, “[t]he connection between inventing and 
patenting is historically tentative; it only started to be firmly established in the 
second half of the eighteenth century.”86 Instead, it was important that a 
merchant be introducing a previously unknown technology or good to 
England—this act, more than showing responsibility for invention, was of 
importance.87 John Duffy further recounts how nonobviousness, a central 
characteristic of patentable inventions today, was of no import at all in the 
seventeenth century in England and did not become important there until 
the nineteenth century.88 From the absence of these requirements, the 
 
as the proper duration of a patent to allow for the teaching of several generations of 
apprentices.”). But see EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND 
CRIMINAL CAUSES 184 (W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1644) (suggesting that seven years was an 
appropriate duration for patents for inventions and noting that this was the length of a single 
apprenticeship); Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits 
and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 326–27 (2000) (suggesting that the 
term limit was instead a compromise between those who favored the traditional monopoly 
term of twenty-one years and those, like Lord Coke, who thought seven years was a 
sufficient term). 
 85. MacLeod explains that the romanticized notion of the individual inventor, 
deserving of a patent grant, was not associated with seventeenth and early eighteenth century 
patenting: 
There was no glory attached to being a patentee. The purchase of a patent 
was a commercial transaction. Patents were expensive to obtain, and 
nobody sought them without an economic end in view. This aim might 
have been to protect and exploit an invention; or it might have been to 
impress potential customers or investors; to escape the control of a guild, 
or to replace a guild’s protective cloak, when that began to grow 
threadbare and competition to increase.  
MACLEOD, supra note 64, at 7. 
 86. Id.; see also Klitzke, supra note 64, at 624. But see Sean Bottomley, Patent Cases in the 
Court of Chancery, 1714–1758, at 14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(pushing the dating back to the first half of the eighteenth century by showing that some 
inventors in that period were obtaining patents and enforcing them in court). 
 87. The purpose remained the encouragement of introduction of inventions “into the 
realm,” rather than the encouragement of invention, qua invention. See Klitzke, supra note 
64, at 627. 
 88. See Duffy, supra note 65, at 33. Duffy recounts the development of the doctrine of 
nonobviousness in the United States, tracing it to language imported from the French Patent 
Law of May 25, 1791 and enacted as part of the U.S. patent law in 1793. Id. at 35–36. 
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mercantilist values underlying early patent law are apparent: the availability of 
inventions was important; rewarding the inventor was far less so.89 
This discussion of pre-industrial age English patent law has not 
specifically addressed the prohibitions on importation that require a choice 
between a national and international rule of exhaustion. The reason for that 
should be clear; these early grants were aimed at encouraging domestic 
manufacture of goods. Where patents were granted for importation, 
however, they carried the exclusive right to it.90 The strong control of 
imports and exports by the government meant that the idea that someone 
else might be able to bring in goods and compete with a patent holder during 
its term was not contemplated and would have run counter to the purposes 
of the patent. Patents secured the national market to the patent holder, but 
came with the requirement of domestic manufacture—a requirement that 
would have been vitiated by the import of manufactured goods.91 For 
 
 89. I do not mean to suggest that there was no interest in encouraging innovation, only 
that it was not the primary driving force behind regulations. See, e.g., Jeremy Phillips, The 
English Patent as a Reward for Invention: The Importation of an Idea, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 71, 74 (1982) 
(detailing a patent grant to George Cobham that states it is made “to encourage others to 
discover like good engines and devices.” (citation omitted)). 
 90. A sample of cases ruling on the circumstances in which patents for imported goods 
could be extended show the disfavor in which importation was held. See VALE NICHOLAS, 
THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 138–39 (2d ed. 
1904). Nicholas quotes various cases that held, somewhat enigmatically, that: 
The merit of an importer is less than that of an inventor. The fact that the 
invention was imported does not take away the merit, but it makes it 
much smaller . . . . If the imported invention is of considerable 
commercial value, and the importer has embarked a large capital in 
endeavouring to introduce it, the patent may be extended . . . . 
Id. 
 91. Thus, the only cases from that time period of which I am aware address the validity 
and extension of a British patent for importation of goods manufactured abroad, under a 
foreign patent. One such case holds that a patent on such imported goods shall not be 
granted an extension in England. Id. at 139; see also ROGER WILLIAM WALLACE & JOHN 
BRUCE WILLIAMSON, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR 
INVENTIONS 372 (1900). Wallace and Williamson describe the case of Johnson’s Patent from 
1871, in which a patent: 
had been taken out in England for an invention also patented in America, 
France, and Belgium. An extension of the patent had been granted in 
America, and the value of the invention was great; but it was shewn that 
the articles protected were manufactured exclusively in America and 
thence imported into England. The Committee refused prolongation. 
Id. The court explained that with patents in both countries, the importer had brought goods 
to England that would have been imported even if there had been no English patent, with 
the only difference that “the patentee would not have had the monopoly of his patent, and 
would not, therefore, have had any opportunity of securing the monopoly of prices.” Id. But 
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mercantilist England, the entire domestic market was the reward that was 
offered, but the price was local working, in keeping with notions of 
maintaining a favorable balance—and composition—of trade. 
It was only after the Statute of Monopolies that invention became more 
important92 and the requirement for a written description eliminated the 
requirements of local working—or practicing a patent at all.93 These 
developments in patent law mirrored those in trade, and show that import 
restrictions are a relic of mercantilist theories that are at odds with current 
law. 
B. MODERN PATENT LAW: A FOCUS ON INNOVATION 
This Article has discussed the question of exhaustion from modern 
patent and trade perspectives, suggesting that they appear to point in 
different directions.94 Approaching the possibility of an international 
exhaustion regime with the understanding of the evolution of patent law in 
concert with changes in trade theory casts the issue in a new light. In 
particular, the changes in patent law that increased the importance of 
innovating activity by a focus on rewarding the rightful inventor and limiting 
grants to inventions that are nonobvious are in line with the movement of 
trade toward a global welfare model. The intentions of the inventor—
whether to introduce technology to the U.S. market or not—are no longer of 
such importance. The move from a working requirement to a disclosure 
requirement is also in line with the idea that invention and disclosure are 
themselves the benefits that patent law seeks to promote. Under this 
understanding, no specific protection of the national market is necessary, 
because there is no quid pro quo of local manufacturing or even local 
 
see Sean Bottomley, The British Patent System During the Industrial Revolution, 1700–1852, 
at 78 (July 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge) (on file with 
author) (discussing Berry’s Patent, an 1850 case in which the patent holder on an imported 
invention was granted an extension, with Lord Brougham stating that importation provides 
“a benefit to the public incontestably, and, therefore, they render themselves entitled to be 
put upon somewhat, if not entirely, the same footing as inventors.” (citing PETER 
HAYWARD, 6 HAYWARD’S PATENT CASES 1600–1883, at 30 (1987)). 
 92. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 20 (1829) (discussing the 
importance of invention and novelty in the English Statue of Monopolies: “That act, after 
prohibiting monopolies generally, contains, in the sixth section, an exception in favour of 
‘letters patent and grants of privileges for fourteen years or under, of the sole working or 
making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor and 
inventors of such manufactures, which others, at the time of making such letters patent and grants, 
shall not use.’ ” (emphasis added) (citing Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. ch. 3 (1624))). 
 93. John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2155 
n.164 (2007). 
 94. See supra Part II. 
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availability. The aspects of mercantilist patent law that made a rule against 
international exhaustion a foregone conclusion are therefore discredited. 
Modern patent law has shed many of the mercantilist trappings of its 
early incarnation. The United States has no local working requirement—and 
no requirement to serve the domestic market at all. John Golden explains 
how United States patent law has mostly avoided a working requirement and 
has “instead viewed disclosure of a patentable invention as essentially full 
compensation for a right to exclude . . . .”95 The notion that the patent is 
issued “[i]n consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the 
community”96 is a far cry from the rights discussed above that came with 
requirements to manufacture locally and train apprentices.97 The focus on 
invention over introduction to the domestic market similarly supports the 
notion that spurring innovation, wherever it may happen and whatever its 
result, underlies modern patent law. These rules admittedly may result in less 
access to goods for domestic consumers and the potential for manufacturing 
industries to be relocated, but these possibilities are contemplated and 
accepted by free trade theorists.98 By positioning patent holders to control 
market entry and manufacturing decisions, the current system embraces the 
free market notion that worthwhile inventions will become available and 
those that are not worthwhile will not receive undue encouragement.99 The 
focus on invention (in contrast to earlier conditions that simply related to the 
availability of goods) and an acceptance that some patents might not be 
practiced both show a reluctance to engage in regulation of markets.  
In addition, patent law is not protectionist in its formalities, and does not 
distinguish based upon the native country of applicants and companies or the 
 
 95. See Golden, supra note 93, at 2155 n.164; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012) 
(stating that relief for infringement may not be denied for “refus[al] to license or use any 
rights to the patent”). 
 96. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (quoting 
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933)). 
 97. In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., the Supreme Court held that a 
competitor might choose to practice one among a number of patents and that such a choice 
was a reasonable business decision that should not deprive the patent holder from excluding 
others from selling patented goods. 210 U.S. 405 (1908). While eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 
388 (2006), limited the availability of injunctions for non-competitor firms, injunctions 
remain available for companies that do not practice their patents if they are able to show that 
the infringement will result in a loss of market share. See Rajec, supra note 30, at 751–58. 
 98. See Sykes, supra note 6, at 61. 
 99. Of course, this notion is subject to criticism: sometimes we may find that access is 
more important than uniform levels of encouragement to innovate and sometimes 
competitive firms may choose to repress new technologies so as not to cannibalize their own 
markets. This claim is therefore descriptive. 
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location of invention.100 This was not always the case; however, the 
requirement of TRIPS that patents be available “without discrimination as to 
the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
imported or locally produced,” has resulted in the elimination of disparate 
treatment for foreign inventive activity or publications for the purposes of 
determining patentability.101 The mercantilist notion of enticing innovators to 
one’s shores to manufacture goods for one’s population is anathema to the 
current system. There is nothing constitutive of patent law that requires 
protecting the national market for the patent holder’s benefit when the 
patent holder does nothing for the domestic market in exchange. Moreover, 
this vestige of market protection will not, on its own, further the purposes of 
aiding domestic industry or encouraging the introduction of goods that 
would otherwise not be available.102 From the domestic perspective, the 
benefits of the national exhaustion regime are available for all U.S. patent 
holders, regardless of whether they manufacture or market goods 
domestically,103 and there is a consensus that the current rule results in higher 
prices for American consumers.104 In addition, with greater harmonization 
among patent regimes worldwide, there should be less need to ensure patent 
holders of their rewards in the domestic market. The strong baseline level of 
intellectual property rights in WTO member countries allows patent holders 
to reap rewards in foreign markets that they could not have expected in the 
past. These gains were ostensibly for the sake of fewer barriers to trade. 
However, the control patent holders hold over trade in patented goods 
remains a barrier to trade. 
 
 100. Although under the Patent Act of 1793, U.S. patents were only available to citizens 
of the United States, Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–19, patents have been 
available to foreign inventors living elsewhere since 1836, Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, sec. 8, 
5 Stat. 117, 120–21. 
 101. TRIPS, supra note 53, art. 27(1); see U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 
1963–2012, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (showing the 
radical increase in percentage of patents resulting from foreign filings from 18% in 1963 to 
40% in 1982, and again to 52% in 2012); see also Hubbard, supra note 61, at 356–58. 
 102. See Hubbard, supra note 61, at 374 (suggesting that changes to U.S. patent laws are 
not useful tools for making American firms more competitive globally, in part because the 
laws are non-discriminatory to foreign inventors and companies filing U.S patent 
applications, as required by TRIPS). 
 103. The availability of an exclusion order at the ITC is dependent on a patent holder’s 
ability to show injury to a domestic industry. However, that requirement is not as strong as it 
sounds, and a patent holder who could not meet that low bar would still have a case for 
infringement through importation in federal district court. See Colleen V. Chien, Protecting 
Domestic Industries at the ITC, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169 (2011). 
 104.  See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 51, at 18; Jeffery Atik & Hans Henrik Lidgard, Embracing 
Price Discrimination: TRIPS and the Suppression of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 27 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 1043, 1044 (2006). 
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IV. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The arguments about undesirable downstream control of goods and the 
benefits of competition, on the one hand, and the ability and potential gains 
of dividing markets, on the other, are not new. They inform the common law 
development of the principle of national exhaustion in patent law and have 
reemerged in considerations of an international patent exhaustion regime. 
A. NATIONAL PATENT EXHAUSTION: DOCTRINE AND THEORY 
The evolution of the national exhaustion doctrine in U.S. law shows 
concerns for many of the same principles discussed so far. Early cases 
wrestled with the extent to which patent holders should be able to subdivide 
the national market for goods, weighed against the interests of consumers in 
using and reselling their goods as they wished. The case law also treats the 
issue in terms of the ability of licenses to constrain downstream behavior. 
The question of restrictive licensing is one that is becoming ever more 
important when many software-based goods are licensed rather than sold, 
and as technological blocks to resale are becoming more prevalent. In fact, it 
may be that the ability to distinguish licenses from sales is becoming ever 
more difficult and will only become more important if exhaustion is 
extended internationally.105 However, even in the late nineteenth century 
courts were balancing freedom to contract with competitive marketplaces. 
The Supreme Court case establishing patent exhaustion involved 
geographic limitations, albeit domestic limitations imposed by license. In 
Adams v. Burke, the Court reviewed a patent infringement claim arising from 
the use of patented coffin lids by an undertaker who bought the lids from a 
licensed manufacturer.106 The manufacturer had been assigned all rights in 
the patent by the patentee, within ten miles of Boston.107 The manufacturer sold a 
patented coffin lid to an undertaker within the prescribed area, but the lid 
was subsequently used farther away.108 The Court held that the right to sell 
may indeed have been restricted by geographical area, but that the purchaser 
“acquired the right to [the] use of it freed from any claim of the 
patentee . . . .”109 The Court based its holding on the single reward theory—
 
 105. See infra Part V. 
 106. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).  
 107. Id. at 456. 
 108. The use was in Natick, Massachusetts, a full seventeen miles from Boston. Id. at 454. 
 109. Id. at 457; see id. at 457–58 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley explained that 
the Patent Act of 1836 expressly authorized: 
not only an assignment of the whole patent, or any undivided part 
thereof, but a “grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any 
patent, to make and use, and to grant to others to make and use the thing 
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the idea that once the patent holder has received her royalties for the use of 
the invention, “it is open to the use of the purchaser without further 
restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentee.”110 The opinion 
recognized both the interests of patent holders in dividing territory for the 
purposes of licensing and the interests of purchasers in using the goods they 
buy without further restrictions, considerations that inform the debate on 
international exhaustion of intellectual property now. In addition, the Court 
noted the single-use nature of the invention at issue.111  
In these early cases, the exhaustion doctrine can be seen as balancing an 
interest in allowing patent holders contractual freedom to license their patent 
as they see fit with an interest in reducing complex limitations on 
downstream use.112 Such restrictions were considered a restraint on 
competition, and the early exhaustion decisions “used the Patent Act to 
create limitations on both vertical and horizontal territorial restraints that the 
Supreme Court would apply under the antitrust laws as well.”113 Thus, early 
exhaustion cases—in similar fashion to their modern counterparts—
frequently involved questions of the scope and ability of licenses to restrict 
downstream uses.114 Occasionally, restrictions on use that are included in a 
 
patented within and throughout any specified part or portion of the 
United States.”  
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 110. Id. at 456; see also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (patent 
exhaustion depends on “whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that 
it may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward for the use of the article”); 
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553–54 (1852) (explaining that the 
congressional power to grant an extension of a patent does not imply “that Congress may, 
from time to time . . . reinvest in [an inventor] right of property which he had before 
conveyed for a valuable and fair consideration”). 
 111. The Court limited its holding to “the class of machines or implements we have 
described” referring to “an instrument or product of patented manufacture which perishes in 
the first use of it, or which, by that first use, becomes incapable of further use, and of no 
further value.” Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. at 456–57. 
 112. See Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. 
L. REV. 235, 286–89 (2013) (suggesting that a numerus clausus principle in intellectual property 
would result in a first sale doctrine in digital works, and looking to the real property analog 
of the historic prohibition on servitudes in chattel for theoretical support); see also Andrew T. 
Dufresne, Note, The Exhaustion Doctrine Revived? Assessing the Scope and Possible Effects of the 
Supreme Court’s Quanta Decision, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 11, 14–15 (2009) (explaining how 
the exhaustion doctrine exhibits “an aversion to personal property servitudes”). 
 113. Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 
103, 110–11 (2008). 
 114. In Bloomer v. McQuewan, the Court addressed the issue of whether an assignment of 
rights, title, and interest in a patent made during the first term of the patent allowed the 
licensee to continue using a machine made pursuant to the license during the second term. 
The Court held that continued use of the patented machines did not constitute infringement. 
 
 344 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:317  
first sale have been honored such that violations are treated as cases of patent 
infringement.115 However, there is some uncertainty as to what characteristics 
define allowable licenses and what makes such a license unenforceable, either 
through contract or patent law.  
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided LG Electronics v. Quanta and 
expanded the reach of the exhaustion doctrine again, restricting a patent 
holder’s ability to limit downstream uses of patented technology through 
patent infringement suits.116 The Quanta Court discussed a series of cases in 
which the Court had limited restrictive licenses that constrained purchasers’ 
use of patented products, situating the exhaustion doctrine as a 
counterweight to attempted expansions of patent rights beyond their 
 
55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). In Mitchell v. Hawley, the Court explained that the right to 
“mak[e] or vend[] the patented machine” was dependent “upon the nature of the 
conveyance,” whereas someone who had gained complete title to a patented machine has 
full right to use the machine, which “ceases to be within the limits of the monopoly.” 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872) (affirming a judgment of infringement because the patent holder 
had issued a license that restricted the licensee’s right to make, use, and license others to use 
the machines to the original patent term, specifying that the licensee was not to license rights 
beyond that original term). The Court therefore held that when two downstream licensees 
continued to use their machines after the original patent term had ended—but the extended 
term had not—they were engaging in an unauthorized use and therefore infringing the 
patent. 
 115. In one notable case, the Federal Circuit ruled on whether a patent holder’s “single 
use only” restriction on a patented medical device could limit use of the devices, such that a 
company infringed the patent when it reconditioned and sterilized the parts to make them 
suitable for reuse. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
The court relied on the idea that sales may be conditioned on particular uses if the license 
does not go beyond the patent grant “and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not 
justifiable under the rule of reason.” Id. at 708. Some suggest Mallinckrodt was likely 
overruled, sub silentio, by the Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., 
553 U.S. 617 (2008). See Hovenkamp, supra note 113, at 111 n.35 (stating that Quanta 
overruled Mallinckrodt); see also Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. 
Supp. 2d 575, 585 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“this Court is persuaded that Quanta overruled 
Mallinckrodt sub silentio”). However, it is possible that Mallinckrodt is distinguishable because it 
involved an initial sale of the patented article that was conditional on single use, whereas 
Quanta involved restrictions on a downstream sale. See, e.g., Chiappetta, supra note 43, at 
1113–15 (2011) (discussing the absence of Mallinckrodt from the Court’s analysis and the 
potentially narrow scope of the Supreme Court’s decision). 
 116. In Quanta, patent holder LG Electronics granted Intel a license to method patents 
practiced in Intel’s chipsets, permitting Intel to manufacture, use, sell, and import its own 
products that practice the patents; but, under a separate agreement, Intel agreed to notify 
customers that while none of the products they purchased infringed patents, the license did 
not extend to combining Intel products with non-Intel products. Quanta purchased chipsets 
and combined them with other products in a computer, and LG Electronics sued. Quanta, 
553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
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intended scope.117 The Court then found that the patent license between the 
parties did not restrict what Intel could sell, and that therefore Intel had sold 
the chipsets to Quanta with no restrictions and thus exhausted LGE’s patent 
rights.118  
These cases leave the impression that exhaustion was developed to target 
a type of patent misuse through limiting restrictions on downstream prices 
and uses of goods. What emerges is a general rule granting deference to the 
terms of a license between a patent holder and manufacturer or retailer, 
limited by an abiding suspicion toward restrictions that accompany patented 
products beyond the privity of the initial contracting parties and thereby 
attempt to cabin the behavior of downstream consumers or resellers. The 
application of the doctrine of exhaustion to restrictive licenses thus targets 
anti-competitive behaviors.119 
Courts have been more lenient toward restrictions that travel with goods 
when those goods are long lasting and easy to replicate perfectly. One area 
where exhaustion is consistently revisited is in regards to self-replicating 
technology.120 The Court in Adams v. Burke relied in part on the single-use 
nature of the patented coffin lids,121 a characteristic that ensures the single 
reward limitation does not deprive the patent holder of rewards from 
multiple future uses of a good. Although someone who purchased a machine 
could use it as he pleased without being subject to claims of infringement, 
 
 117. Id. at 625–26 (citing Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1913) (holding 
that the right to sell exclusively secured in the patent statute does not include the right to 
downstream price-fixing that “prevents competition by notices restricting the price at which 
the article may be resold”); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502, 518 (1917) (disallowing a claim of patent infringement against downstream users who 
disobeyed a notice affixed to the patented projecting-kinetoscopes they had purchased and 
used film produced by another manufacturer in the machines); United States v. Univis Lens 
Co., 316 U.S. 241 (barring, under a doctrine of exhaustion, price-fixing by a patent holder 
who sold unfinished lenses for glasses to licensed wholesalers and retailers who ground the 
lenses into patented products—with the requirement that they be sold to consumers at a 
fixed rate). 
 118. Id. at 636–37; see also F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Elecs.: Frustrating Patent Deals by 
Taking Contracting Options Off the Table?, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315, 316 (2008) (criticizing 
Quanta for its likely restrictions on contracting freedom, arguing that the case “may greatly 
frustrate the ability of commercial parties to strike deals over patents”). 
 119. Depending on the observer, patent misuse is either coextensive with—or 
consumed by—antitrust doctrine. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc. 694 F.2d 505, 512 
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that antitrust “consumes” the misuse doctrine); 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, 3–12 (supp. 2012) (“Generally speaking, 
patent misuse doctrine is largely coextensive with antitrust doctrine.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Bowman v. Monsanto, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); Capitol Records, LLC v. 
ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); discussion supra note 115. 
 121. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456–57 (1873). 
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the purchase did not entitle him to manufacture, use, or sell replicas of that 
machine. And yet, some technologies replicate themselves by force of nature 
or design. Most recently, the Supreme Court was faced with a patent 
infringement claim brought by Monsanto, which holds patents on soybean 
seeds, genetically modified to withstand being sprayed with the herbicide 
Roundup.122 The Court held that the farmer who bought patented seeds from 
a grain elevator and, without permission, planted the seeds and harvested the 
newly-grown seed crop had infringed Monsanto’s patents, based in part on 
Monsanto’s restrictive licensing agreement.123 When Monsanto sued 
Bowman, Bowman claimed that the authorized sale of seeds to the grain 
elevator exhausted Monsanto’s patent rights, such that the company could 
not claim infringement based on how a subsequent purchaser used the 
seeds.124 The Supreme Court held that while Bowman could have consumed 
the seed, fed it to animals, or sold it to others, his use of the patented seeds 
to “make” new, patented seeds was infringement.125 
In Bowman v. Monsanto, the Court recognized that while the exhaustion 
doctrine is meant to limit the patent holder to a single reward on each 
patented object, it should not be used to limit the patent term to “only one 
transaction” by allowing a purchaser to make unlimited copies of the 
patented good.126 In so doing, the Court had to deal with the strict license 
that accompanied sales of the patented seed. It may be that courts have a 
higher tolerance for restrictive licenses over technologies amenable to 
multiple uses and easy replication.  
 
 122. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761. 
 123. Id. Monsanto protects its patented seeds through a licensing agreement that allows 
a grower to plant the seeds in a single season. The resulting crop may be harvested and sold, 
and is often sold to a grain elevator, which consolidates crops from multiple farmers and 
sells the seeds for human or animal consumption. Monsanto’s licensing agreement forbids 
the grower from saving harvested soybeans to replant or resell for planting. Bowman did not 
save harvested seeds to plant, but rather bought seeds from the grain elevator that were 
meant for human or animal consumption (and which therefore did not require a license 
from purchasers), planted them, sprayed them with Roundup, and then harvested and 
replanted the resulting seeds in subsequent years. Id. at 1764–65. 
 124. Id. at 1765. 
 125. Id. at 1766–67. The Court explained that planting the seeds and growing a crop 
from them was likely always infringement, but that the license granted by Monsanto 
(allowing farmers to plant the seeds in one season only) rendered that use noninfringing. Id. 
at 1767 n.3. Thus, although the purpose of the patented inventions was to create seeds that 
grow well, the initial sale of seeds did not confer the right to plant them without a license. 
The Court did note that, in the instance of the sale by Monsanto or its authorized seed 
sellers, the right to plant the seeds once might also be inferred if there had not been a license 
agreement, presumably because that was what the seeds were created for and because the 
characteristic that warranted the patent could only be realized through replication. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1768. 
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Behind the Bowman opinion was also recognition of another area of 
potentially self-replicating technology that may try the exhaustion doctrine—
domestically and internationally—namely, software. Software provides an 
interesting example because it can be protected by both copyright and patent, 
and because strict definitions of copying or making under the respective acts 
do not neatly apply to software.127 Thus, the Copyright Act contains a 
provision limiting the exclusive reproduction right by allowing the owner of a 
copy of a computer program to make a copy of the software in order to use 
it and allowing the transfer of such copies (when coupled with the transfer of 
related rights).128 A provision that would expand this limitation and create a 
first sale doctrine for digital material was proposed but has not been 
adopted.129 Recently, in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., a court found there 
was no such right under the current statute.130 Software is also of interest 
because it has gravitated toward a model of complex licensing as opposed to 
sale. This can be seen as a direct result of its place on the spectrum from 
single-use to self-replicating technology. Single-use technologies may be 
easier to rule with an exhaustion regime because an item may be sold and 
resold, but once it is used it will not be used again. As a result, when the 
rights holder exhausts her rights in the patent by selling an article embodying 
it, she need not track its whereabouts or worry about infringement. In 
contrast, self-replicating technologies and digital technologies that allow for 
the creation of exact copies are particularly susceptible to infringement. Thus, 
for single-use articles, limiting a rights holder to a single reward does not put 
in jeopardy her ability to reap subsequent rewards from other sales of a good, 
whereas other technologies lend themselves to infringement, thus replacing 
some of the demand for the product with infringing copies and threatening 
 
 127. The eligibility of software for multiple types of intellectual property protection is 
not unique to the technology. It does, however, point to the desirability of theoretical and 
doctrinal consistency between the areas in regards to international exhaustion, inter alia. 
 128. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2012). This provision allows those who buy software to install it 
on their computer hard drives and make backup copies—both of which constitute copying 
but are central to the industry. For example, copyright owners fully expect—and desire—
their customers to install software on their computers, much as Monsanto fully expects 
farmers to plant their seeds, though such planting results in making a copy of protected 
seeds. 
 129. Proponents of this exception suggested that making a copy of material should not 
be considered an infringement if that material was simultaneously deleted from the machine 
on which it was lawfully placed. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: STUDY EXAMINING 17 U.S.C. SECTIONS 109 AND 117 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (2001), available 
at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2001/report-congress-study-examining-17-usc-sections-
109-and-117-pursuant-section-104-digital. 
 130. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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the rights holder’s ability to reap rewards from other sales. All of these 
factors result in greater interest in licensing for easily replicable and self-
replicating technologies. 
Alas, complex licensing schemes may also be used by rights holders to 
complicate and restrict future sales of a product, even when such sales are 
not attempts to engage in replication or infringement. The exhaustion 
doctrine in domestic law must balance allowing patent holders to protect 
their patented goods through reasonable licensing practices with limiting 
restrictions on downstream use that the patent holder should have no 
reasonable expectation of curtailing and that may be beneficial to society at 
large, even if undesirable to the patent holder. This is not an easy balance. 
However, it is one undertaken and constantly refined by the courts in their 
application of the exhaustion doctrine in the domestic context. National 
exhaustion laws are applied in ways that allow greater licensing restrictions 
for technologies susceptible to self-replication or easy and exact replication 
by others. Nonetheless, overaggressive use of such licensing may backfire 
and result in findings that what the parties took to be a license was actually a 
sale.131 These same types of consideration apply equally in the international 
context and will merit more scrutiny if international exhaustion is adopted. 
B. A DIFFERENT RULE FOR INTERNATIONAL PATENT EXHAUSTION  
The Supreme Court has not recently weighed in on the question of 
international exhaustion of patents, declining opportunities in 2002 and 2013 
to hear cases that presented the issue.132 Older case law indicates that there 
 
 131. Shubha Ghosh explains:  
Sales trigger exhaustion while licenses or leases do not. Through these 
mechanisms, the parties can structure the transaction to suit their 
particular needs, and the rights holder can price accordingly. The difficulty 
is deriving workable criteria to distinguish between a sale and a lease. Such 
criteria can be difficult given the complexities of actual transactions that 
will contain myriad terms dealing with the allocation of various risks 
under different contingencies. Nonetheless, in principle, the exhaustion 
doctrine can deal with consumer heterogeneity through threshold rules of 
applicability based on the transaction. 
SHUBHA GHOSH, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 8 (2013), available at http:// 
ictsd.org/i/publications/181092; see also Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not 
Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1887 (2010) (in 
the copyright context); Timothy D. Greene, “All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent 
Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2012) (in the context of standing). 
 132. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 536 U.S. 950 (2002), denying cert. to 264 
F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1656 
(2013), denying cert. to 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This does not necessarily mean that the 
Supreme Court will not take a case on the issue in the future; these particular cases may have 
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was a limited rule of exhaustion when the owner of patents in multiple 
countries sold a patented product without restriction. In 1890, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Boesch v. Graff that U.S. patent rights were not exhausted by 
lawful manufacture and sale in Germany.133 Although the sale was indeed 
lawful, it was not authorized by the patent holders, who held patents in both 
the United States and Germany.134 Rather, the manufacturer was entitled to 
manufacture and sell the products under a type of prior user right in the 
German patent law, which allowed those who were preparing to produce a 
patented article at the time the patent was filed to do so without 
authorization.135  
Following Boesch, the potential for patent exhaustion through a first, 
authorized sale abroad appeared to depend on whether the entity that 
authorized the foreign sale was the entity trying to enforce the U.S. patent. In 
Dickerson v. Matheson, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained that if a 
foreign purchase was from the owner (or licensee) of both the foreign and 
U.S. patents, then U.S. patent rights were exhausted, but held that a purchase 
from a licensee of only the foreign patent did not exhaust U.S. patent rights.136 
 
been poor vehicles for the issue. However, it appears likely that the Court was considering 
whether the exhaustion question must be answered for both the patent and copyright law 
simultaneously as it declined review of Ninestar the same day that it granted, vacated, and 
remanded two copyright cases in light of Kirtsaeng. 
 133. Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 703 (1890). The Boesch Court determined: 
The right which Hecht had to make and sell the burners in Germany was 
allowed him under the laws of that country, and purchasers from him 
could not be thereby authorized to sell the articles in the United States in 
defiance of the rights or patentees under a United States patent. . . . The 
sale of articles in the United States under a United States patent cannot be 
controlled by foreign laws. 
Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 701. It is an open question whether the Court would have come to the same 
conclusion had the manufacturer operated with authorization from the holder of the patents 
(both U.S. and German).  
 136. Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 F. 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1893). The court explained: 
A purchaser in a foreign country, of an article patented in that country 
and also in the United States, from the owner of each patent, or from a 
licensee under each patent, who purchases without any restrictions upon 
the extent of his use or power of sale, acquires an unrestricted ownership 
in the article, and can use or sell it in this country. 
Id. This is consistent with the pre-Boesch case of Holiday v. Mattheson, in which a U.S. patent 
holder sold patented goods in England with no restrictions or conditions. Holiday v. 
Mattheson, 24 F. 185, 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885). The court refused to enjoin a downstream 
purchaser from reselling the goods in the United States. Id. (“[w]hen the owner sells an 
article without any reservation respecting its use, or the title which is to pass, the purchaser 
acquires the whole right of the vendor in the thing sold”). Cf. Featherstone v. Ormonde 
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The 1909 case Daimler Manufacturing. Co. v. Conklin also granted an injunction 
to an exclusive licensee of a U.S. patent against someone who purchased a 
car—with patented components—while in Germany, from the company 
authorized to sell the patented goods there, and later imported it to the 
United States for personal use.137 Soon after, the court in Curtiss Aeroplane & 
Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Engineering Corp. found international exhaustion 
and distinguished Daimler, basing its decision on the patent holder’s 
ownership of all relevant rights.138 The court found that the holder of patents 
in both the United States and Canada exhausted its rights under both patents 
through its wartime sale of airplanes and manufacturing licenses granted to 
the British government, although those licenses only referred to the Canadian 
patents, finding the patent holder had not placed any restrictions on the sale 
or licenses.139 Thus, there was no infringement by the company that 
purchased the airplanes from the British government following the war and 
made offers to sell them in the United States.140 Ultimately, the impression 
given by Boesch and the cases decided soon after it is that the owner of 
patents in multiple countries exhausts rights in them all through his first, 
unrestricted sale.141 The cases rely on the agency of the patent owner in 
 
Cycle Co., 53 F. 110, 111–12 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (granting to an assignee of U.S. patent 
rights an injunction against licensees of British patent who had rights to use the patented 
tires in Britain but subsequently tried to sell them in the U.S., with the court explaining that 
“the purchaser does not acquire any right greater than those possessed by the owner of the 
patent”). 
 137. Daimler Mfg. Co. v. Conklin, 170 F. 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1909) (explaining that “[t]he 
sale by a German patentee of a patented article may take it out of the monopoly of the 
German patent,” then asking “but how can it take it out of the monopoly of the American 
patentee who has not sold?”); see also Daimler Mfg. Co. v. Conklin, 160 F. 679, 681 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (detailing terms of exclusive license for import and sale of cars with 
patented components). 
 138. Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d 
Cir. 1920). 
 139. Id. at 79 (“It is admitted that, if the aeroplanes which are alleged to infringe had 
been built in Canada under a limited license, or under a Canadian patent, and then brought 
into the United States, infringement would have been made out. But that is not this case.”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 79. The court approvingly cites a British judge’s recitation of the rule, the 
cited case found no exhaustion:  
When an article is sold without any restriction on the buyer, whether it is 
manufactured under either one or the other patent, that, in my opinion, as 
against the vendor gives the purchaser an absolute right to deal with that 
which he so buys in any way he thinks fit, and of course that includes 
selling in any country where there is a patent in the possession of and 
owned by the vendor. 
Id. 
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deciding to sell the patented product and on the reward he is due to collect 
for it—but only once.142 
 In Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods, Inc., a district court reached 
different conclusions on exhaustion for patent holder Sanofi and its licensee 
American Home Products, which had exclusive U.S. rights to sale.143 Because 
Sanofi’s subsidiary had sold veterinary drugs in France—without written 
restrictions on future United States sales—the court found that Sanofi had 
exhausted its rights in the patent and could not obtain an injunction against 
later importation and sale.144 However, the court looked to the terms of 
American Home Products’ exclusive license to determine what rights Sanofi 
had maintained. The court concluded that Sanofi could not sell (in France) 
what it did not have (the right to sell in the United States), and therefore 
allowed American Home Products to obtain an injunction.145 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”)146 did 
not wrestle with these interpretations of Boesch in its 2001 decision, Jazz Photo 
Corp. v. International Trade Commission (Jazz Photo I). Instead, it held more 
broadly that there was no rule of international exhaustion of patents,147 and 
in later cases strengthened the rule in contradiction to the early 
interpretations offered by the Second Circuit. In Jazz Photo I, the Federal 
Circuit reviewed a proceeding at the International Trade Commission that 
 
 142. Ultimately, limiting international exhaustion to cases of multiple patent ownership 
has the potential to cause much mischief. Ignoring the incentive for companies to set up 
complicated subsidiary and affiliated entity-structures (and the difficulties for courts of 
unraveling those that already exist), an inventor who sells all her rights to the patent in a 
foreign country presumably is being “rewarded” for all future sales under the patent. The 
value she puts on this is embodied in the sale price and will depend on whether there is 
international exhaustion or not. For that reason, an international exhaustion regime should 
be based on authorization from the patent holder, but authorization to sell in a particular 
market should be sufficient; there is no reason to require that the patent holder place the 
particular good on the market herself. 
 143. Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Products, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931 (D.N.J. 1983). 
 144. Id. at 938. 
 145. Id. at 939–40 (holding that patent rights are only exhausted “where the sale is one 
which the seller had the authority to make in this country”). 
 146. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals in cases 
involving patents, including cases brought at the International Trade Commission under 19 
U.S.C. § 337. The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction over other trade-related cases appealed 
from the United States Court of International Trade, however the § 337 cases have provided 
the vehicle for rulings on international patent exhaustion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5)–(6) (2012). 
 147. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Jazz Photo I), 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (“United States patent rights are not exhausted by products of foreign 
provenance. To invoke the protection of the first sale doctrine, the authorized first sale must 
have occurred under the United States patent.” (citing Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 701–03 
(1890))).  
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resulted in an exclusion order on disposable cameras covered by patents held 
by Fuji Photo Film Co.148 A number of firms, primarily in China, bought 
used disposable camera cartridges from film developers in many countries 
and reloaded them. Fuji Photo Film brought the case against importers who 
purchased and imported the reloaded cameras for sale in the United States.149 
The opinion from the ITC focused on whether reloading the cameras 
constituted noninfringing “repair” of a patented product or infringing 
“reconstruction.”150 Repair of a patented article is considered “use,” which 
cannot be controlled following an authorized sale, whereas reconstruction, 
which “requires a more extensive rebuilding of the patented entity,” is 
considered “making” a new, patented article.151 The Federal Circuit reversed 
the ITC’s holding that reloading the cameras was reconstruction, and found 
instead that it constituted repair.152 Because the initial camera sales had been 
authorized, that might have been the end of it. However, the court then went 
on to hold that because many of the initial, authorized sales had been in 
foreign countries, they did not exhaust rights in the U.S. patents; as a result, 
the repaired cameras were excludable and only cameras that had been the 
subject of an authorized first sale in the United States were noninfringing.153 
The Jazz Photo I case has been criticized for imposing an inefficient “default” 
rule on sales of patented products,154 for its potential to seriously restrict 
traditional forms of commerce and behavior,155 and for deciding the issue 
without briefing, sua sponte.156 There was soon an opportunity for fully 
 
 148. Id. at 1099. 
 149. It is interesting that this case, like Adams and Mallinckrodt, involved sales of items 
intended for single use. The court distinguished Mallinckrodt with the finding that the 
statements on each camera cautioning consumers not to remove film and to return the 
camera to the photoprocessor did not constitute a limiting license on their use. Id. at 1107. 
 150. Id. at 1101. 
 151. Id. at 1104. 
 152. Id. at 1107. 
 153. Id. at 1105. 
 154. See Chiappetta, supra note 43, at 1122. 
 155. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11–12, Jazz Photo v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 536 
U.S. 950 (2002) (No. 01-1158), 2002 WL 32134396 (suggesting that, among other problems, 
“the owner of a patented property item purchased abroad (such as a camera, watch, or car) 
can no longer use it in the United States without infringing the patent. No firm may repair 
that item to prolong the owner’s use without risk of liability for contributory infringement.”). 
 156. Id.; see also Adam Mossoff, Commercializing Property Rights in Inventions: Lessons for 
Modern Patent Theory from Classic Patent Doctrine, in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: REGULATING INNOVATION 348–49 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua 
D. Wright eds., 2011). 
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briefing international exhaustion, when Jazz Photo appealed a district court 
judgment against it.157 
In Fuji Photo Film Co., v. Jazz Photo Corp. (Jazz Photo II), the Federal Circuit 
again refused to apply exhaustion to authorized foreign sales, holding that 
“[t]he patentee’s authorization of an international first sale does not affect 
exhaustion of that patentee’s right in the United States.”158 The court’s 
reasoning was that the foreign sales did not occur “under” a U.S. patent and 
that a contrary ruling would contravene the rule against the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law.159 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta, one 
district court held that Jazz Photo I & II were no longer good law, as its 
theory was undercut by the Supreme Court’s ruling that blocked a patent 
holder from authorizing a sale but suing a downstream purchaser for 
infringement.160 Of course, the Quanta Court had merely voiced the same 
concerns that are present in all domestic exhaustion cases; restating it did not 
answer the question of its applicability to foreign transactions. Another 
district court case that attempted to cabin Jazz Photo I & II held that where 
the parties had negotiated a worldwide license, exhaustion might occur even 
if the first sale was made in a foreign country.161 However, the strong rule 
against exhaustion from Jazz Photo I & II has mostly held, although in 
complex technology areas with multiple assembly steps the question of 
whether a sale is “under” a U.S. patent is not entirely straightforward.162 This 
 
 157. Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp. (Jazz Photo II), 394 F.3d 1368, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (beginning description of the litigation history by noting that “Fuji and Jazz 
are no strangers to this court”). 
 158. Id. at 1376. 
 159. Id.; see also John A. Rothchild, Exhausting Extraterritoriality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1187, 1211–12 (2011) (arguing that an international exhaustion rule would not constitute 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law). This contrasts with the requirement discussed in 
Kirtsaeng that a work be made “under this title” to qualify for exhaustion. Kirtsaeng v. John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013). Under current patent law, an authorized 
U.S. sale of a patented good made abroad would exhaust further rights. 
 160. LG Electronics, Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046–47 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). 
 161. STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Sandisk Corp., No. 4:05CV45, 2007 WL 951655, at *3 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2007). The court stated: 
STM gave Toshiba a license in all types of patents with respect to the 
licensed products in all countries of the world. All the countries of the 
world includes the United States of America. Therefore, Toshiba (or its 
subsidiaries) had the right to sale any of the licensed products under the 
United States Patents ’626 and ’184 in the United States or anywhere in 
the world. 
Id. at *3. 
 162. See, e.g., Cornell Research Found., Inc. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., No. 5:01-CV-1974 
(NAM/DEP), 2007 WL 4349135, *50–52 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2007) (denying summary 
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complexity highlights the potential savings for companies engaged in 
complex technologies that would come from a default rule of international 
exhaustion. In Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, the Federal Circuit held that Quanta, 
which did not involve foreign sales, did not impact the rule against 
international exhaustion.163 And although the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to address international patent exhaustion in an appeal from 
Ninestar recently, it declined.164 
C. THE UNITED STATES POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
Despite arguments that the Federal Circuit rule is overly restrictive, its 
approach appears to be consistent with the United States’ policy in its trade 
discussions. These policies have been consistently expressed in negotiations 
for patent law harmonization across various platforms. However, 
international exhaustion is a rare example of an area of intellectual property 
law specifically and consistently left out of the extensive multilateral treaties 
that treat minimum requirements of patent protection.165 The TRIPS 
Agreement represents an enormous step toward harmonized patent law.166 It 
built upon previous agreements that primarily implemented procedural 
harmonization, adding substantive harmonization through requirements of 
minimum levels of protection.167 In addition to substantive measures, the 
TRIPS Agreement has enforcement mechanisms that previous treaties did 
not. Disputes among member countries over TRIPS violations are resolved 
 
judgment on the issue of where the sales occurred for purposes of an exhaustion 
determination, following an exhaustive discussion of the evidence); see also Laserdynamics, 
Inc. v. Quanta Storage America, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-348-TJW-CE, 2009 WL 3763444, at *1 
(E.D. Tex. June 29, 2009); Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 140–41 (D.D.C. 
2006); Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 374 F. Supp. 2d 202, 215–16 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 163. Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 164. Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1656 (2013), denying cert. to 667 
F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The case was the result of an enforcement action brought against 
the wholly owned subsidiaries of a Chinese producer of ink printer cartridges that had 
continued to import and sell cartridges subject to exclusion and cease and desist orders in an 
earlier proceeding. Ninestar, 667 F.3d 1373. The Federal Circuit did not take the opportunity 
to revisit its international exhaustion jurisprudence, likely because the case was an appeal of 
penalties assessed for “deliberately and in bad faith” violating an earlier exclusion order. Id. 
at 1378–79. For procedural and prudential reasons, then, this may not have presented an 
attractive case for the Supreme Court to use in addressing the question of international 
patent exhaustion. 
 165. See TRIPS, supra note 53, art. 6. 
 166. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2816 (1999) (describing the TRIPS Agreement as effecting a “tectonic shift in the landscape 
of intellectual property law”). 
 167. Requirements address patent-eligible subject matter, standards of patentability, and 
the duration and scope of rights. Rajec, supra note 29, at 16–17. 
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by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.168 Where violations are found, 
the offending member country may find itself facing serious trade 
sanctions.169 
Although TRIPS has resulted in significant movement toward 
harmonized global patent law, the agreement has some flexibility for 
countries to craft their own laws. And, because patent law is territorial, there 
are also de facto variations in how it is applied. One subject countries could 
not come to an agreement about was exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights. Despite reaching agreements on many hotly debated topics, countries 
were unwilling to compromise.170 As a result, TRIPS explicitly states that 
“nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”171 
As further rounds of multilateral trade agreements have faltered, progress 
in trade agreements has been made through bilateral or regional trade 
agreements. The United States has pushed for and often included “TRIPS-
plus” measures in such agreements—patent protection measures that go 
beyond the minimum requirements laid out in the TRIPS Agreement. Some 
of these measures address exhaustion. Thus, for example, the U.S.-Morocco 
free trade agreement requires that the exclusive rights to prevent importation 
“shall not be limited by the sale or distribution of that product outside its 
territory,”172 thus requiring members not to implement international 
 
 168. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
 169. The area in which the sanction is imposed need not be related to the violation. Id. 
art. 22.3. 
 170. The explicit dodge of the international exhaustion issue reflects the disagreement 
among countries on this issue. Australia, for example, was in favor of an international 
exhaustion regime—at least for copyrights—arguing that domestic consumers would benefit 
from it. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
62–63 (1998) (citing Memorandum of the WIPO Bureau for the Committee of Experts on a 
Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, WIPO Doc. BCP/CE/IV/2 (Mar. 15, 1994)). 
 171. TRIPS, supra note 53, art. 6. This exclusion is only subject to the articles requiring 
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. Id. arts. 3–4. National treatment is 
the requirement of treating nationals of other member countries as well as one’s own 
members, while most-favored nation treatment requires treating nationals of any other 
member country as well as nationals of other member countries. Thus, while member states 
may maintain their rules on exhaustion, those rules must not be applied in a manner that is 
discriminatory to nationals of other member states. 
 172. United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art 15.9(4), June 15, 
2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final-text. 
The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement similarly precludes a regime of international 
exhaustion, “at least where the patentee has placed restrictions on importation by contract or 
other means.” United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.9(4), Jan. 1, 
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exhaustion. Thus, it appears that the understanding of the executive branch 
has been that there is currently no international exhaustion in patent or 
copyright law.173 In addition, the United States has been in negotiations for 
an Asia-Pacific trade agreement, known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (“TPP”).174 Although negotiations have primarily been conducted 
in private, leaked draft versions indicate that the United States has opposed a 
rule of international exhaustion.175 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND CRITIQUES 
An international exhaustion rule for patents might have seemed highly 
unlikely in the years since Jazz Photo I & II were decided—and particularly in 
the context of the United States’ position in trade negotiations. However, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kirtsaeng signals a willingness to 
reconsider exhaustion in the copyright context, supported by policy 
considerations that apply mutatis mutandis to patent law.176 Indeed, most of the 
reasoning is consistent with the justification for the rule of national patent 
exhaustion177 and, given the global nature of commerce and consumption, 
their application to a global market provides a natural next step. However, 
practical considerations about implementation remain. In addition, 
international patent exhaustion may present particular concerns for the 
pharmaceutical industry and make more salient concerns already raised by 
national rules of exhaustion, such as the appropriate treatment of restrictive 
licensing and the need—or potential—for differential treatment for single-
use versus self-replicating technologies. 
 
2005, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/ 
asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf. 
 173. Justice Ginsburg mentions this in her Kirtsaeng dissent. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1373 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s bold 
departure from Congress’ design is all the more stunning, for it places the United States at 
the vanguard of the movement for ‘international exhaustion’ of copyrights—a movement 
the United States has steadfastly resisted on the world stage.”); see also infra Sections V.A–
V.B. 
 174. Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105 (2012). 
 175. See Trans-Pacific Partnership art. QQ.A.12 (draft Aug. 30, 2013), available at 
http://wikileaks.org/tpp (noting that the United States, Australia, Japan, and Mexico oppose 
language suggesting that “[t]he Parties are encouraged to establish international exhaustion 
of rights.”); see also Flynn et al., supra note 174, at 130–31 (2012) (discussing the proposed 
provision). 
 176. Although the Court’s statutory construction is critiqued below, it is not applicable 
to the patent law question. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra Section IV.A. 
 2014] INTERNATIONAL FREE TRADE IN PATENTED GOODS 357 
A. KIRTSAENG AS A MODEL: COPYRIGHT’S FIRST SALE DOCTRINE GOES 
GLOBAL 
The U.S. position against international exhaustion for patents is called 
into question by the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. that the first sale provision of the Copyright Act has no 
geographical limitations—in other words, U.S. copyright is governed by 
international exhaustion.178 Although the separate statutory and common law 
development of patent and copyright law would allow for different rules, the 
theory underlying arguments for and against international exhaustion is the 
same for both fields.179 In addition, many goods are covered by multiple 
types of intellectual property rights, so that absent adoption of international 
exhaustion for patents, the purposes of the copyright rule would be thwarted 
when applied to products also covered by patents. For these reasons, if 
international exhaustion in copyright law is defensible, it should be 
considered in patent law, too. The Kirtsaeng decision is a good place to start. 
In Kirtsaeng, the Court ruled that importation and sale of books purchased 
from a Thai subsidiary of a U.S. publisher did not constitute copyright 
infringement because the original purchase exhausted the U.S. copyright 
holder’s rights to exclude future sales.180 Section 109 of the Copyright Act 
sets forth the rule on exhaustion, also known as the “first sale” doctrine, as 
an exception to the exclusive distribution rights of copyright owners, and 
provides that “the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this 
title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of . . . that copy.”181 Section 109 thereby codifies the first 
 
 178. See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1371. 
 179. The story is different in trademark law, which has different theoretical and 
statutory underpinnings. Trademark law is generally understood to follow a rule of 
international exhaustion, with a widely applied exception for when “genuine, but 
unauthorized, imports differ materially from authentic goods authorized for sale . . . because 
a difference in products bearing the same name confuses consumers and impinges on the 
local trademark holder’s goodwill.” Societe des Produits Nestle v. Casa Helvetia, 982 F.2d 
633, 635 (1st Cir. 1992). Courts have generally emphasized the differences between imported 
trademarked goods and authorized goods, thus allowing for de facto geographic price 
discrimination through trademark law. Thus, without changes to that area of law, consistent 
with Kirtsaeng and potential changes in patent law doctrine, a regime of international 
exhaustion in intellectual property could be undermined. See generally Charles E. Colman, 
Post-Kirtsaeng, ‘Material Differences’ Between Copyright and Trademark Law’s Treatment of Gray 
Goods Persist (New York University School of Law Public Law Research, Paper No. 13-40, 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2281562. 
 180. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355–56. 
 181. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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sale doctrine that had previously emerged in common law.182 A separate 
provision, § 602, explains that importation of copies acquired abroad 
“without the authority of the owner of a copyright under this title . . . is an 
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies . . . under [§] 106.”183 
Because the first sale provision is an exception to the exclusive right 
referenced in the importation provision, the Court has held that the first sale 
doctrine also limits findings of infringement through importation.184 In 
Quality King Distributors v. L’anza Research Int’l, the Court held that importation 
of an authorized copy made in the United States, sent abroad, and sold 
before reimportation did not violate the importation provision.185 That ruling 
did not address the issue of copies made abroad.186 In particular, the first sale 
doctrine’s requirement that a copy be “lawfully made under this title” was 
clearly satisfied by the authorized copy made in the United States. The 
Kirtsaeng Court had to decide whether authorized copies made abroad were 
“lawfully made under this title,” and thus subject to the first sale doctrine.187 
The Court framed the question as whether there was a geographical 
component to the “lawfully made” requirement, and determined there was 
not.188 
The decision can be understood in part as choosing between two 
statutory interpretations, neither of which was likely contemplated by the 
drafters.189 Either the first sale doctrine would apply to copies made abroad, 
 
 182. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (applying the first sale 
doctrine to copyright law, for the first time, in the case of a publisher who attached a notice 
setting a floor on resale prices for the book, and holding that copyright does not allow 
impositions on future sellers “to future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of 
contract”). 
 183. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (2012); see also § 602(a)(2) (deeming it infringement to import 
copies “the making of which either constituted an infringement of copyright, or which 
would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable”). The 
separate treatment of unauthorized copies in § 602(a)(2) might suggest that § 602(a)(1) was 
aimed at copies that were authorized, but the Court did not address this distinction in 
Kirtsaeng. 
 184. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145 (1998). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1357–60. 
 189. The Court discusses the legislative history of the importation provision and the 
Copyright Office’s explanation of the current version, which states that importation without 
permission “would violate the exclusive rights of the U.S. copyright owner . . . where the 
copyright owner had authorized the making of copies in a foreign country for distribution 
only in that country.” Id. at 1369 (citing COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 6, PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS, 88TH 
CONG., 2D SESS., 150 (Comm. Print 1964)). Although that quote contemplates that copyright 
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thus diminishing the reach of the importation ban significantly,190 or it would 
only apply to copies made in the United States, with the result that rights in 
copies made abroad would never be exhausted, even if the copies were 
imported and sold by the copyright owner.191 This second interpretation 
would allow publishers to control all downstream sales of books initially 
published abroad, creating incentives for publishers to move operations 
abroad and allowing for restraints on future sales that are at odds with a 
functioning market.192 Although the Kirtsaeng opinion avoids an undesirable 
 
owners would be able to authorize publication for sale in particular markets and then block 
importation of works made for that market—precisely the type of market segmentation that 
was disallowed domestically by the first sale provision—the Court concluded that the 
importation sections were not intended to address the issue of first sale. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1369. But see id. at 1373 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“I think John Wiley may have a point 
about what 602(a)(1) was designed to do” after summarizing his argument that the rightful 
purpose of that section was “enabling copyright holders to segment international markets.”). 
It is also surprising that the Court did not contrast the relevant importation provision for 
“work[s] that have been acquired outside the United States . . . ,” 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) 
(2012), with the subsequent clause that addresses importation of copies, “the making of 
which either constituted an infringement . . . or which would have constituted an 
infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable,” a section that seems to describe 
works made without authorization in contrast to the previous section that only discusses 
where the works were acquired. Instead, when discussing this section, the Court suggests 
that it proves the American Copyright Act is “applicable to all pirated copies, including those 
printed overseas.” Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1359 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the fact that the 
drafters distinguished between works made abroad and works made abroad that would have 
been infringing if the title had been applicable is used by the Court to prove that the Act is 
applicable everywhere. This reading is strained at best. 
 190. See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1373 (Kagan, J., concurring) (agreeing that the 
importation provision is greatly limited by this decision, but suggesting that Quality King was 
the problem). As explained by Justice Kagan: 
allowing the copyright owner to restrict imports irrespective of the first-
sale doctrine—i.e., reversing Quality King—would yield a far more sensible 
scheme of market segmentation than would adopting . . . Wiley’s 
argument here. That is because only the former approach turns on the 
intended market for copies; the latter rests instead on their place of 
manufacture. 
Id. at 1373 n.2. 
 191. Id. at 1362 (explaining that “a geographical interpretation of the ‘first sale’ 
clause . . . would grant the holder of an American copyright . . . permanent control over the 
American distribution chain (sales, resales, gifts, and other distribution) in respect to copies 
printed abroad but not in respect to copies printed in America”); id. at 1365 (explaining the 
effects of a geographical interpretation on technology companies whose products contain 
copyrightable software programs, as “[m]any of these items are made abroad with the 
American copyright holder’s permission and then sold and imported (with that permission) 
to the United States.”) (citing Brief for Retail Litigation Center, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, 
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (No. 11-697), at *4). 
 192. Id. 
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interpretation, the new doctrine of international exhaustion of copyright was 
not likely contemplated by the law’s drafters. 
The statutory interpretation that underlies the Kirtsaeng decision, while 
interesting, does not constrain the possibilities for patent law. The patent law 
doctrine is not bound by statutory language, and the common law gives 
room for doctrinal evolution over time. Nonetheless, the policy arguments in 
Kirtsaeng brought out the same themes discussed in Part II, supra, recognizing 
the interest rights holders have in segmenting markets, but ultimately finding 
those outweighed by the interests in competition and a robust resale market. 
In particular, the Court looked at the historical movement away from 
protectionism and toward competition in addition to considering the effects 
of the rule on particular institutions and industries. Thus, the Court put its 
decision in context by noting legislative movement away from protectionism 
in the copyright law’s elimination of a limitation on works manufactured 
outside the United States.193 As previously discussed, a historical view of 
patent law provisions and their movement away from protectionism shows 
that the maintenance of national markets can be seen as one of the last relics 
of protectionism, and one that, alone, does not work.  
The Court also explained the purposes of exhaustion in the domestic 
context through the policies driving its earlier, common law evolution.194 In 
particular, the Court referenced the common law’s “refusal to permit 
restraints on the alienation of chattels,” which are “against Trade and 
Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting.”195 In addition to historical ideas 
about restraints on alienation, the Court noted that exhaustion is supported 
by the antitrust law’s purpose of “maximiz[ing] consumer welfare by 
encouraging firms to behave competitively.”196 These same concerns about 
downstream markets apply in patent law as well.197 Of interest, the Court 
 
 193. The Court pointed to the elimination in 1976 of the “manufacturing clause” that 
limited importation of copies made outside the United States (or Canada), explaining that the 
purpose of that change was to “equalize treatment of copies manufactured in America and 
copies manufactured abroad.” Id. at 1361 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 165–66 (1976)). 
The Court has noted this change before. Id. (citing Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012)) 
(“Congress has moved from a copyright regime that, prior to 1891, entirely excluded foreign 
works from U.S. copyright protection to a regime that now ‘ensure[s] that most works, 
whether foreign or domestic, would be governed by the same legal regime.’ ”).  
 194. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363. 
 195. Id. (citing EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 223 (1628)). 
 196. Id. at 1363 (quoting 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 100 (3d ed. 
2006)). 
 197. See supra Part III. 
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summarily dismissed the common argument about the benefits of price 
discrimination, explaining that “no basic principle of copyright law” suggests 
entitlement to this right.198 Finally, the Court also discussed the practical and 
negative effects of a geographical restriction on particular industries, such as 
the used book industry, libraries, art museums, technology companies whose 
products contain copyrightable software, and other retailers who sell goods 
with copyrighted packaging, logos, etc.199 These businesses rely on their 
ability to import works made abroad, works which once resold are 
indistinguishable from works made within the United States, such that a rule 
allowing continued control of the goods would constitute barriers to 
commerce. The consequences of such a rule to these industries, the Court 
suggests, would be “intolerable.”200 Many of the goods to which the Court 
referred are likely to be covered by patent protection as well as copyright. 
Copyrighted packaging may well contain patented materials, and products 
including software are also generally protected by patents as well. To the 
extent the Court was concerned about the control of importation or resale of 
these products, Kirtsaeng only takes us part of the way.201 An analogous rule in 
patents would free the goods. 
B. QUESTIONING THE BENEFITS OF GEOGRAPHIC PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION 
Previous Sections have argued that maintaining different rules for 
national and international exhaustion is at odds with the current purposes of 
patent and trade law. However, the economic argument against international 
exhaustion posits that the geographical price discrimination that is possible 
under national exhaustion carries benefits that would be lost in a move to 
international exhaustion. According to this view, the social welfare effects of 
international exhaustion would result in less innovation and less access for 
consumers in low-income countries, so that the otherwise outdated 
distinction between foreign and domestic sales is justified because it is best 
suited to meet the objectives of the patent system. There are insufficient data 
for an empirical conclusion either way. However, the traditional argument 
 
 198. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1371. 
 199. Id. at 1364–65. 
 200. Id. at 1366. 
 201. It is true that the parade of horribles envisioned in Kirtsaeng would not fully apply in 
patent law. Remember that the Court was concerned that rights in products made abroad 
could never be exhausted by an authorized sale, as those goods were not “lawfully made 
under” the U.S. Copyright Act. For patents, even without a rule of international exhaustion, 
an authorized U.S. sale or importation of goods made abroad still exhausts rights. See supra 
note 159. 
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against international exhaustion fails to recognize the costs of geographical 
price discrimination—costs that are exacerbated by growing income 
disparity. These include access costs for poorer consumers in otherwise high-
income countries, although even with geographical price discrimination poor 
consumers in low-income countries also have limited access.202 In addition, 
the models fail to account for substitute price discrimination measures firms 
would likely undertake to limit the contemplated ill effects. These substitute 
measures could result in more access as firms find other ways to target broad 
and diverse markets. 
Price discrimination occurs when a seller—particularly a monopolist—
charges different prices to different buyers, based on some measure of their 
willingness to pay.203 Perfect (or “first-degree”) price discrimination describes 
the situation of a monopolist who sells to each consumer at the highest price 
she is willing to pay.204 It is, however, a “never-attained theoretical limit.”205 If 
such a thing were possible, it would result in the greatest gain to the seller 
who could make more sales, extracting the highest possible price for each 
one. It would also theoretically result in greater consumer access to goods, 
because everyone willing to pay more than the marginal price of production 
of a good would be able to obtain it.206 However, there would be no 
consumer surplus—that is, no one would be able to buy the good for less 
than the highest price they were willing to pay. Instead, the consumer surplus 
that would have existed without discriminatory pricing would all accrue to 
the monopolist.207 
In reality, companies find many ways to engage in price discrimination, 
sometimes through volume discounts or “versioning” methods that 
differentiate consumers according to their willingness to pay—both types of 
second-degree price discrimination.208 One example of versioning is the 
 
 202. See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 203. See ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 389–95 (8th ed. 2010). 
 204. Id. at 393. 
 205. Id. at 394 (explaining that imperfect knowledge of consumer preferences make 
first-degree price discrimination impossible). 
 206. Id. at 394. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 395–96. Volume discounts are one type of second-degree price 
discrimination, in which the seller induces the buyer to reveal her preferences. One example 
of a volume discount is the pricing structure utilities companies use, charging less per 
kilowatt-hour after a certain limit has been reached. Companies can also try to differentiate 
consumers who are willing to pay more from those willing to pay less by setting “hurdles,” 
such as mail-in rebates, that only some customers will undertake the nuisance of completing. 
“Versioning” refers to selling slightly different products, possibly introduced at slightly 
different times, such as hardcover, paperback, and electronic books. See id.; William W. 
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different amounts of memory or processing power that come with tablet 
computers and the regular introduction of newer models.209 Third-degree 
price discrimination occurs when sellers “separate [buyers] into groups that 
correspond roughly to their wealth or eagerness.210 The classic example is 
using demographic generalizations to grant discounts to certain groups, such 
as student or senior discounts in movie theaters.211 All of these methods are 
imperfect, but allow sellers to reach consumers they might otherwise not 
reach while maintaining higher prices for a large portion of the market. The 
success of such methods from the seller’s viewpoint depends in part on how 
well the division differentiates markets.212 For example, versioning is 
successful if high-income buyers do not see a cheaper version of a product as 
a sufficient substitute for the more expensive one. It also requires that 
arbitrage be limited, so that low-cost buyers are unable to resell goods to 
high-cost buyers.213  
The description and requirements of third-degree price discrimination 
apply to patents and a rule of national exhaustion.214 A rule of national 
exhaustion allows patent holders to engage in geographical price 
discrimination, offering goods at lower prices in lower-income markets while 
preserving their ability to sell at higher prices in higher-income markets. This 
theoretically results in higher returns to the patent holder,215 higher costs to 
consumers in high-income markets, and lower costs (and therefore greater 
access to goods) in lower-income markets. It follows that elimination of 
geographical price discrimination would result in lower returns to patent 
 
Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2007). 
 209. This differentiates consumers willing to pay more for greater computing capacity 
and those willing to pay more for the newest version of electronics. 
 210. Fisher, supra note 208, at 4. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Id. at 4 (“the firm must be able to differentiate among its customers on the basis of 
the values they place on the firm’s product”). 
 213. David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and 
International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT’L ECON. 167, 170–71 (1994). 
 214. The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination are generally considered to 
be ambiguous. Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 870 
(1985) (generalizing results that price discrimination only increases welfare when it results in 
increased output). 
 215. Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 64 (2002) (“Parallel importation invariably reduces the rents that are 
earned by pharmaceutical patent holders. To the degree that those rents are important to 
inducing worthwhile R&D investments, as suggested above, this effect is unfortunate.”). But 
see Peter Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 844–45 (2007) (suggesting 
that Sykes “overstate[s] the practical impact of [parallel] importation.”). 
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holders, lower prices in high-income markets, and less access for those in 
lower-income countries. This is because the threat of competition from 
goods bought abroad and imported for sale—parallel imports—would cause 
patent holders either to raise prices abroad or to decline to sell in low-income 
markets.216 David Malueg and Marius Schwartz suggest, in this vein, that 
when there are great income disparities between countries, international 
exhaustion (and the uniform pricing that resulted) would lead to lower 
welfare than a system of national exhaustion.217 Mattias Ganslandt and Keith 
Maskus also critique international exhaustion, disagreeing that it necessarily 
results in lower prices in high-income locations because of changes in 
distributional structure that would result.218 Kamal Saggi discusses the 
interests and motivations of different countries and companies, suggesting 
that the combination of intellectual property rights protection now mandated 
by TRIPS with an international exhaustion policy by high-income countries 
would result in welfare gains to companies and consumers in those countries 
at the expense of consumers in low-income countries.219 This argument 
conflicts with the previous two with respect to patent holders, but the 
conclusion that national exhaustion allows for greater welfare is the same. 
The economic arguments in favor of geographic price discrimination are 
not without caveats or critics. The caveats are that these theoretical models, 
while useful, make assumptions that are not necessarily borne out in reality 
 
 216. Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 213, at 171; see also Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection in Developing Countries: The Case of Pharmaceuticals, 8 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N. 326, 329–30 (2010) (arguing that pharmaceutical companies might not serve 
low-income countries or may raise prices there if there is parallel importing). 
 217. Id. If patent holders continue to place goods on separate markets at vastly different 
prices, then it is true that consumers in high-income markets benefit from parallel trade. 
However, because the patent holder controls market entry of the patented goods worldwide, 
we can expect that her behavior ex ante will change. One way it might change is that she 
stops selling goods at different prices and introduces a worldwide price (with some variation 
to account for transportation and other distribution cost differences among regions). 
Another option is for the patent holder to choose not to make goods available in some low-
income markets in order to preserve high returns in the high-income market. 
 218. Mattias Ganslandt & Keith E. Maskus, Vertical Distribution, Parallel Trade, and Price 
Divergence in Integrated Markets, 51 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 943, 944 (2007) (suggesting that 
the conclusion that “permitting [parallel imports] unambiguously brings down retail prices in 
expensive locations is misleading”). Ganslandt and Maskus argue that in response to an 
international exhaustion regime, intellectual property rights holders may consolidate 
distributors and change wholesale pricing in ways that would obviate perceived benefits to 
consumers. Id. at 945. 
 219. Kamal Saggi, Market Power in the Global Economy: The Exhaustion and Protection of 
Intellectual Property, 123 ECON. J. 131, 135 (2013). However, these results would change if 
strong intellectual property rights were necessary to induce importation of technology, for 
industries where there is a quality gap between innovator companies and imitators. Id. 
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or fail to account for reactions other than those modeled.220 Gene Grossman 
and Edwin Lai suggest that international exhaustion may provide more 
support for innovation than national exhaustion by encouraging countries 
that use price controls to raise their prices, thus providing greater 
remuneration to patent holders.221 Peter Yu raises a question about the extent 
to which firms currently engage in price discrimination that permits access to 
low-income markets.222 In particular, Yu suggests that concerns about parallel 
imports in the pharmaceutical industry are overblown, both because many 
pharmaceutical companies have chosen not to enter lower-income markets 
even with a rule of national exhaustion and because the vast wealth 
disparities within some countries leads companies to target only the high-
income market instead of selling at lower prices.223 If the opportunity for 
geographical price discrimination is not resulting in greater access, the 
argument for keeping it gets weaker. Although Yu discusses the 
pharmaceutical market, this critique also questions the usefulness of 
geographic markets as demand indicators in general. As discussed above, 
price discrimination works best when it successfully differentiates markets 
and arbitrage is limited. A rule of national exhaustion satisfies the second 
condition, but its application to the first may be questioned. For example, 
even developed countries have increasingly large levels of wealth disparity,224 
 
 220. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 51, at 11 (noting Maskus’s reminder that current static 
game theory models were incomplete and pointing to later work that shows how the 
reduction of trade barriers will result in increasing benefits from parallel trade). 
 221. Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, Parallel Imports and Price Controls, 39 RAND 
J. ECON. 378, 380 (2008) (arguing that worldwide international exhaustion leads to more 
innovation than national exhaustion for industries with price controls because countries face 
the possibility that innovator companies will choose not to sell to them). Grossman and Lai 
base their argument on the idea that governments with price controls will tend to raise their 
price caps under a scheme of international exhaustion to ensure that producers will continue 
to serve their market. However, in the drug industry, many countries with price caps also 
require companies to fulfill demand and are able to threaten compulsory licensing when the 
demand is not met. 
 222. Yu, supra note 215, at 844–45. 
 223. Id.; see also Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic 
Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563, 566 (2002) (explaining that sometimes “pharmaceutical 
firms and their distributors in poor countries may find it more profitable to sell drugs in low 
volumes and high prices to wealthier patients with price-inelastic demand rather than in high 
volumes at low prices to poorer patients”). 
 224. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, An 
Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries: Main Findings, in DIVIDED WE 
STAND: WHY INEQUALITY KEEPS RISING 21, 22 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
els/soc/49499779.pdf. In America, the GINI coefficient, a measure of income inequality 
that is 0 under conditions of perfect equality and 1 under complete inequality, has steadily 
risen from 0.399 in 1967 to 0.466 in 2001, according to information from the U.S. Census 
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and therefore increasingly diverse levels of demand. The social welfare 
argument for geographical price discrimination becomes weaker when it does 
not result in greater access for low-income countries and simultaneously 
results in high prices for poorer members of developed countries. With 
regards to limitation of arbitrage: one reason that geographical price 
discrimination is so attractive to patent holders is that enforcement costs are 
relatively low. However, this is a benefit that only accrues to the patent 
holders. Borders are relatively easy to patrol for infringing goods,225 and a 
hefty portion of the cost is borne by the government through its deployment 
of customs officials rather than the patent holder. This makes a national 
exhaustion rule more attractive to rights holders, even when national markets 
are not an ideal basis for distinguishing among variable levels of demand. 
Another critique is that geographical price discrimination should be 
compared with a regime in which sellers engage in other forms of price 
discrimination, rather than a world with uniform pricing. Patent holders in an 
international exhaustion regime will be unable to sell to large portions of 
foreign markets if they engage in uniform pricing (or choose not to sell 
abroad at all).226 If their only choices are whether to sell and how to set the 
price, the arguments suggesting there will be a worldwide, uniform price or 
abandonment of foreign markets may be correct. However, patent holders 
may well choose to offer more versions of patented products and engage in 
second-degree price discrimination mechanisms to capture more of the 
market. This reaction would mitigate access concerns for consumers in low-
income countries. In fact, if companies faced additional pressure to develop 
multiple versions of a good, we could expect increased access in both low- 
and high-income countries (where income disparity may already omit a 
number of people from the market). 
In sum, geographic price discrimination likely results in higher returns to 
patent holders. However, some of these higher returns are due to 
enforcement burdens taken on by customs officials. In addition, while 
geographic price discrimination allows for greater access by residents of low-
income countries, in practice these populations are often underserved even in 
 
Bureau. See Historical Income Tables-Income Equality, http://web.archive.org/web/20070208 
142023/http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/ie6.html. 
 225. Based on laws that require importers to declare goods and have them inspected, as 
opposed to domestic market transactions that may be conducted entirely privately and may 
therefore be difficult for patent holders to detect. 19 U.S.C. § 1484 (2012) (requiring that 
importers use reasonable care in making entries and classifying the imported merchandise). 
 226. But see Ganslandt & Maskus, supra note 218, at 4 (“It is conceivable that wholesale 
prices may be set in a way that offsets or even counteracts the anticipated impacts of an 
open [parallel importation] regime.”). 
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our current regime. Last, proponents of geographic price discrimination fail 
to account for the likely move of firms to other forms of price discrimination 
that might better segment and identify groups with differing demand curves. 
A rule of international exhaustion would likely encourage better price 
discrimination. The appropriate scope of that price discrimination is taken up 
in the next Section. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER FORMS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
This Article has suggested that patent holders will engage in other forms 
of price discrimination in response to an international exhaustion regime. 
This and other strategic moves patent holders make in response to 
international exhaustion merit more analysis. For example, price 
discrimination through versioning may be overall beneficial because it will 
result in greater access and the customers who pay more will in fact receive 
something more for the higher price. However, other potential consequences 
of a move to international patent exhaustion are increased use of licenses as a 
means for patent holders to maintain control over their goods and increased 
use of technological measures to maintain such control.  
Restrictive licenses circumvent limitations on restraints on alienation and 
could redo by contract what I have suggested undoing by international treaty. 
In the world of electronics and software, goods are increasingly licensed 
rather than sold. These licenses—and technological measures that restrict 
their violation—may frustrate resale, but they also allow for a form of price 
discrimination that may be more tailored than geographic methods. Thus, 
one’s position on licensing need not be dictated by one’s support for 
international exhaustion. Nor should the potential for more restrictive 
licenses in and of itself conclusively argue against international exhaustion. 
Many of the same questions about the benefits of price discrimination versus 
those of a robust resale market and reduced transaction costs apply to the 
licensing debate. Indeed, the doctrinal development of the exhaustion 
doctrine in the United States has been a story about balancing the ability of 
parties to contract for limitations on patent licenses with the transaction 
costs associated with goods having complex limitations on all future 
transactions.227 Geographic limitations are but one possible type. 
Another related consideration is the extent to which common ownership 
of the relevant intellectual property rights should matter to a determination 
that an “authorized” first sale has taken place and exhausted a patent holder’s 
 
 227. See Mossoff, supra note 156, at 12 (describing the ability of nineteenth century 
patent holders to impose a “litany of restrictions on the use of the property interest they 
conveyed to a licensee”). 
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rights. This question has been presented in patent,228 copyright,229 and 
trademark230 cases in the national and international contexts. The early patent 
cases ruled that exhaustion only occurs for unconditional sales made by 
owners in multiple jurisdictions, whereas granting exclusive, geographic 
licenses to different entities allows each to use the patent laws to enforce 
their entitlements, thereby presenting a type of default interpretation on sales 
that a patent holder could overcome through explicit licensing and 
restrictions.231 These decisions, while perhaps right as applied among the 
various licensees, may need to be recalibrated to the extent they allow 
restrictions to travel with the goods, affecting unwitting downstream 
consumers. Just as the scope of permissible licensing presents questions, the 
potential for licensing to separate entities to avoid exhaustion will require 
further scrutiny and doctrinal development.  
The proper scope of the exhaustion doctrine as applied to non-
geographic restrictions and to particular forms of technology is a topic that 
merits further inquiry—particularly if there is widespread adoption of an 
international exhaustion regime. This move would bring into focus the issue 
of the allowable scope of private restrictions on the movement of goods. It 
does not, however, argue against bringing international patent law into 
conformity with domestic law, or patent law into conformity with copyright 
law. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION 
There are many ways that a rule of international patent exhaustion could 
be implemented. The simplest is that it could be unilaterally adopted by the 
Supreme Court, which could distinguish Boesch on the basis that the sale in 
Boesch did not involve authorization from the patent holder. In doing so, the 
Court would bring together patent and copyright doctrine by finding 
exhaustion following an authorized first sale, worldwide. However, this 
would diminish the possibility of benefitting from the greater gains that 
 
 228. See supra Section IV.B. 
 229. For a discussion of how licensing can be used to avoid exhaustion for copyrighted 
works, see Clark D. Asay, Kirtsaeng and the First-Sale Doctrine’s Digital Problem, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 17 (2013); Carver, supra note 131.  
 230. In Établissement Consten, Grundig had rights to a trademark and licensed to Consten 
the right to register the trademark in France in Consten’s name, thereby planning to enjoin 
imports of the trademarked goods in Germany, where Grundig held the trademark. The 
European Court of Justice found this violated the competition law of the European 
Economic Community (“EEC”) Treaty by attempting to artificially maintain separate 
markets. Joined cases 56 & 58/64, Établissement Consten S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 
299. 
 231. See supra Section IV.B. 
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would come from a harmonized world rule of international exhaustion. In 
particular, transaction costs would only be slightly lower with one more 
country participating in a regime of international exhaustion, whereas the 
ability to engage in cross-border manufacture without concerns about 
crisscrossing licenses would eliminate an entire class of transaction costs. 
Short of a worldwide exhaustion regime, it might be possible to implement 
various multilateral exhaustion regions (such as the European Union already 
has) or to engage in a reciprocal recognition of exhaustion. A worldwide 
exhaustion regime aligns better with the purposes of TRIPS, and a patent 
holder’s decision to license or sell rights in another territory ought not to 
remove a patent from the potential for exhaustion. 
From a patent law perspective, the harmonization TRIPS brought to 
procedural and substantive laws governing patents provides a number of 
benefits. One benefit is certainty to inventors and investors that their 
inventions will receive protection worldwide, thus inspiring advancement in 
new technology areas and technology transfer to new markets.232 
Harmonization also lowers costs—both direct costs (e.g., by allowing central 
filing for multiple countries) and the indirect costs of understanding and 
analyzing various sets of laws and their implications.233 From a trade 
perspective, inadequate (or differential) intellectual property protection can 
constitute a non-tariff barrier to trade.234 Thus, in a country with strong 
patent rights, patent holders are likely to commercialize and market their 
goods; however, those same patent holders will be wary of exporting and 
making the goods available in a country without patent protection because 
others may copy the innovation and compete with the patent holder.235 In 
 
 232. See Rajec, supra note 29, at 41–42 (discussing the certainty justification for 
harmonization of global patent law); see also Frederick M. Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of 
TRIPS: A Challenge for the World Trading System, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 499 (1998) (noting 
that TRIPS provides “the enhancement of [industrialized country-based enterprises’] legal 
security in a wider portion of the world market”). 
 233. See Rajec, supra note 29, at 46. 
 234. 1 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992), at 707–08 
(Terence P. Stewart ed., Kluwer Law 1993); see also TRIPS, supra note 53, pmbl. (stating that 
the agreement was intended “to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, 
and tak[e] into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights . . . .”).  
 235. The potential for such imitations to be exported back to the strong-patent-rights 
country may also lessen incentives to invest. This problem is addressed through bans on 
infringing imports and by increased harmonization on laws governing counterfeits. In fact, 
concerns about trade in counterfeit goods provided some of the strongest motivation to 
include intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round negotiations. TRIPS, pmbl. 
(“[r]ecognizing the need for a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines 
dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods”). 
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this way, the minimum standards of protection set by the TRIPS Agreement 
were seen as reducing a barrier to trade. 
A harmonized rule on exhaustion would have further reduced such 
barriers.236 Instead, there is a patchwork of rules. The European Union, for 
example, practices regional exhaustion for goods that are placed on the 
market within the European Union.237 Other countries practice international 
exhaustion.238 The United States has continued to adhere only to national 
exhaustion. It would be possible and permitted under the WTO to 
unilaterally adopt an international exhaustion regime for patents (as the 
United States has now done for copyright), but if international exhaustion in 
fact makes sense (as I argue it does), it does so in a world with harmonized 
international exhaustion. The gains to manufacturing efficiency and the 
certainty of freedom to use and resell goods is much greater if manufacturers, 
downstream retailers, and users do not have to keep in mind the multiple 
different treatments of goods that occur depending on which countries’ 
versions of a patent apply to particular goods or parts of goods. In addition, 
using the WTO framework to bind all member countries eliminates the 
potential for strategic decisions by countries to tailor their exhaustion stance 
in deference to current constituencies that seek short term gains.239 For that 
reason, any movement toward international exhaustion from the United 
States should be a move toward a harmonized regime of international 
exhaustion. 
 
 236. During negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, A.A. Yusuf and A. Moncayo von 
Hase suggested that the decision of whether to implement a regime of international 
exhaustion “has profound implications for the free movement of goods and services across 
national boundaries, and thus for international trade in general.” Yusuf & Moncayo von 
Hase, supra note 45, at 116 (advocating for an international exhaustion regime). 
 237. This rule was first introduced in decisions of the European Court of Justice, Case 
78/70, Deutsche Grammophon, GmbH v. Metro-SB-Großmärket, GmbH, 1971 E.C.R. 
487; Case 15/74 Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, and later adopted 
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European Union arts. 28, 30, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 59–60. Switzerland has also 
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 238. Some countries that have adopted international exhaustion by statute include 
Egypt, South Africa, Argentina, Costa Rica, India, Malaysia, and China. 
 239. See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, 
International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333, 348 (2000) 
(explaining the various exhaustion regimes by suggesting that “[n]ations (and regions) are not 
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A worldwide rule of exhaustion would represent a significant change in 
current policy. The United States was stalwart in its refusal to implement 
international exhaustion during TRIPS negotiations.240 A shift in position 
might therefore have some worth in future multilateral negotiations relating 
to intellectual property. In other words, moving to an international 
exhaustion regime is both desirable in theory and of potential negotiating use 
as a practical matter. 
Other possibilities are a regional or development-based multilateral 
exhaustion regime. Under such a regime, markets with roughly similar 
characteristics might create zones of exhaustion. The benefits would be that 
patent holders could still engage in some degree of price discrimination, 
assured that goods placed on the market in other “zones” would not be 
imported and compete with goods in high-income locations. At the same 
time, manufacturers could avoid transaction costs associated with cross-
border manufacture by producing goods within a given zone. And 
consumers could still expect some level of competition between the various 
intrazone markets. Nonetheless, this idea is deeply problematic because of its 
potential to entrench countries within a particular zone, as the costs of 
breaking into a new one would become barriers to development. If a country 
were part of a lower-income zone and also a manufacturing zone, for 
example, the costs of trying to move into a higher-income zone would 
include consumer loss as prices went up and the loss of manufacturing jobs. 
Such a situation would be inconsistent with the purposes of the WTO 
agreement, if not with its substantive rules.241 
E. ADDRESSING CRITIQUES: THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The pharmaceutical industry may warrant special treatment when it 
comes to price discrimination because of the non-market nature of the 
heavily regulated industry and because of the importance access to healthcare 
plays in global notions of human rights. Concerns about the availability of 
patented drugs in low-income countries are not merely academic.242 The 
 
 240. See also GERVAIS, supra note 170, at 60–63. 
 241. A regional exhaustion regime might violate most-favored nation requirements by 
treating imports from different countries differently, although not necessarily resting on 
nationality of patent holders. See TRIPS, supra note 53, art. 4 (requiring that “any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country 
shall be accorded . . . to the nationals of all other Members”). 
 242. See Ellen t’Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A 
Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 27 (2002) (describing that ninety percent 
of those killed by infectious diseases each year are in the developing world and suggesting 
that “[t]he reasons for the lack of access to essential medicines are manifold, but in many 
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importance of access to medicines has spurred concerns with the 
requirements of minimum levels of patent protection throughout the history 
of the TRIPS Agreement.243 One of the main points of contention between 
the global north and the global south during negotiations was the treatment 
of patents for pharmaceutical products. Many developing and least 
developed countries did not allow them, and there was great concern that 
implementing such regimes would lead to a crisis in access to medicine for 
poor countries.244 Whereas nongeographic forms of price discrimination may 
be effective for many consumer goods,245 these methods do not lend 
themselves easily to use in the pharmaceutical industry. For example, 
providing less effective versions of drugs for lower prices is conceptually and 
ethically problematic. As a result, one of the strongest counterarguments to a 
regime of international exhaustion focuses on the effects such a regime 
would have on patient populations in poor countries. The argument is that 
major pharmaceutical companies will refuse to sell in such low-income 
markets because the potential for parallel imports to erode the very large 
profits they glean in high-income markets would make it unprofitable.246 The 
other side of the same argument against international exhaustion centers on 
the high cost of research and development that goes into drug development 
and the relative ease with which drugs can be reverse engineered.247 Under 
this argument, the losses to pharmaceutical companies under an international 
exhaustion regime would lower incentives to innovate significantly. From 
either perspective, drugs are special. Access is of greater importance in the 
area of health, and profits derived from patents are valued more by 
innovators in this area. 
The strong control of market entry exercised by the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) (and equivalent agencies in other developed 
countries) could be used to exempt drugs sold to least developed countries 
from international exhaustion.248 Drugs must go through an approval process 
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before they may be marketed. In the United States, the FDA has a complex 
process for companies wishing to sell drugs—patented or not—to patients 
that aims to ensure the drugs are both safe and effective.249 The registration 
of drugs and approval of processes mean that the FDA serves as a 
gatekeeper for all who wish to sell drugs in the U.S. market, and an 
expansion in this role to exclude drugs first sold in least developed countries 
would not exceed the scope of the agency’s current expertise.  
While a patent holder could respond to the introduction of international 
exhaustion by not selling drugs in low-income markets at all, this would be 
an undesirable outcome because it might result in a lack of access to 
lifesaving medicines. Alternatively, the decision could raise the possibility of 
countries engaging in compulsory licensing to produce generic versions of 
lifesaving drugs.250 This result would still insulate the pioneer drug makers 
from parallel imports because drugs produced pursuant to a compulsory 
license would not be interpreted as authorized sales.251 However, this result 
imposes costs (lost sales to the otherwise willing drug company, procedural 
costs of procuring a license, and—although relatively small—the costs to 
generic drug companies of reverse engineering). With a small margin for 
profits in least developed countries to start with, these inefficiencies could be 
problematic to the access cause. A better policy would encourage patent 
holders to manufacture and sell drugs to low-income markets and reserve 
compulsory licenses for situations where patent holders are unwilling to do 
so. The position of the FDA as a market gatekeeper means that drugs sold to 
 
that “no [prescription] drug . . . which is manufactured in a State and exported may be 
imported into the United States unless the drug is imported by the manufacturer of the 
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certain countries, or under certain conditions, could be exempted from 
international exhaustion, thus encouraging drug companies to sell drugs at 
the cost of production (or below) without concerns about parallel imports. 
In addition to access to medicine issues for poor countries, the drug 
industry may be appropriate for special treatment because it is subject to 
price controls in so many countries.252 These market conditions mean that in 
many places, patent holders have little control over the price at which they 
introduce products to the market, making the single reward justification for 
international exhaustion less compelling. Under a regime of price control, the 
autonomy of the patent holder in choosing to place goods on the market at a 
given price is no longer so clear. While patent holders may retain the choice 
of whether to sell, they no longer decide a price. For developed or developing 
countries that engage in price controls, patented medicines are bought at 
prices much lower than in countries (like the United States) that do not 
engage in such measures. And unlike the case of compulsory licensing, such 
sales are authorized. A regime of international exhaustion could be 
devastating to patent holding companies facing competition from imports in 
countries that engage in such pricing.253 The potential for lower prices of 
imported goods would not be a consequence of comparative advantage in 
manufacturing or the benefits of increased competition, but a result of 
disparate regulatory control.254 
One possible solution would be to exempt pharmaceuticals from parallel 
importation entirely. Such a move would recognize that although similar 
levels of patent protection exist in all WTO member countries, other market 
forces intervene to alter the benefits a patent confers. In this sense, it is the 
unequal protection afforded to pharmaceutical products by patents that 
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creates barriers to trade in patented goods. However, as with any rule 
targeting a particular technology area, this could result in line-drawing 
problems. The scope of the exemption from international exhaustion could 
extend to all pharmaceutical products or methods of treating diseases using 
chemical compounds, but it could also cover treatment with biosimilars. 
Implementing legislation would have to describe a category that itself is 
growing due to innovation.  
While implementation of a wide-scale exemption could be delegated to 
the FDA, another possibility for treatment of drugs sold subject to price 
regulations would draw upon trade mechanisms and the expertise of the 
agencies that implement them. Under this potential scheme, imports of 
patented pharmaceuticals from countries engaged in price controls could be 
treated as potentially dumped goods under trade law, sold in a non-market 
industry (akin to non-market economies in trade).255 Under our trade law, 
foreign manufacturers and importers cannot sell goods in the United States 
at less than fair value—that is, they cannot “dump” their goods on the U.S. 
market, because of the harm that would do to domestic industry.256 If such 
dumping is found, the Department of Commerce calculates the amount by 
which the sale is lower than normal value and taxes imports accordingly, 
raising the prices of the imported goods on the U.S. market so that they are 
in “fair” competition with domestically produced goods. In the drug 
industry, drugs imported from single-payer system countries would surely sell 
for less than domestically produced drugs, but because their U.S. prices 
would be comparable to those of the home market, they would not usually 
qualify as dumped. However, there is special treatment of goods that come 
from a non-market economy, defined as a foreign country that does “not 
operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of 
merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the 
merchandise.”257 Drugs don’t function according to market principles of 
pricing.258 Therefore, the Department of Commerce would be free to 
compare their prices in the United States with a “constructed fair market 
value,” which would likely be the market value in the United States. The 
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treatment of imports of drugs from single-payer systems as dumped 
merchandise is one possibility for controlling the potential downsides of a 
system of international exhaustion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States should adopt a rule of international exhaustion in 
patent law. This would bring the law in line with copyright law and vindicate 
the practical goals of the Kirtsaeng opinion. But more importantly, it would 
apply theory that was once only considered in the national context to 
international sales and movements of goods in a way that increases 
competition and lowers barriers to trade. Modern trade law operates under a 
recognition that greater global welfare comes from increased competition 
and freedom for downstream innovators, retailers, and consumers. Although 
patent law has adopted some of the formalities of modern trade theory, it has 
so far clung to the protection of national markets for patent holders. This 
change would involve increased costs to patent holders, but it is unlikely that 
those increases will be as drastic as some argue. In addition, the change may 
encourage other forms of price discrimination that better track differences in 
consumer preferences. An increase in other forms of price discrimination 
brings into relief questions—already important in domestic law—about the 
appropriate level of control patent holders should have over downstream 
sales. These are undoubtedly important questions. However, the answers 
should not depend on geographical borders. A move to international 
exhaustion would bring patent law in line with trade theory and allow for free 
trade in patented goods. 
 
 
